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Abstract
The number of countries worldwide that have allowed citizens abroad the
opportunity to vote in elections taking place in their country-of-origin has risen sharply in
the last thirty years. Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have followed
this global trend of granting voting rights to their migrant communities. However, the
source of this trend in Latin America and the Caribbean has not been well addressed in
the political science literature. This study seeks to minimize that gap by analyzing the
determinants of external voting rights for 27 countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, using data from 1980-2012. The study applies the Cox Proportional Hazard
Model to determine which variables increase the likelihood of external voting
legislation. Furthermore, case studies of Chile and Mexico are presented. The thesis
concludes by emphasizing the impact of remittances, political leaning of the government,
and the political calculations that politicians must take when deciding whether or not to
adopt external voting laws.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
In the span of a few decades, the number of countries in the world granting their
citizens abroad the right to vote has significantly increased. Despite the fact that a
majority of the world’s countries and territories now allow external voting in some form,
and that external voting has been implemented in every region of the world (Navarro,
Morales and Gratschew, 2007) the political science literature has not paid much attention
to this important topic.
The goal of this thesis is to find out why external voting legislation has been
adopted in Latin America and the Caribbean. Countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean have followed a global trend, as the number of countries allowing those abroad
the chance to vote has sharply risen in the last thirty years. However, the source of this
trend in Latin America and the Caribbean remains a puzzle. First of all, extending the
voting base has the potential to challenge those in positions of authority and weaken their
power. As Jack and Lagunoff have stated, “expansion of political rights by ruling elite is
at first glance paradoxical. The elite, after all, dilutes its power when it extends these
rights to others” (2006, 552). Secondly, allowing those abroad to vote also reduces the
power of the electorate as a whole, as it can be argued that each vote that is cast abroad
decreases the power of votes in the homeland. Therefore, one would expect that those in
power would be hesitant to adopt laws that enfranchise those living abroad.
In the subsequent chapters, I will examine in detail some of the potential factors
that might help explain why external voting has been adopted and implemented in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Several prominent explanations are often mentioned in the
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scholarly literature for why external voting legislations have been implemented,
including: that sending states are willing to grant political right to migrants in order to
receive economic and political benefits in return; states have started to view the notions
of citizenship and the nation-state in a different way; and that the globalization of the
world’s population has pressured states to adopt external voting.
Numerous countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are highly dependent on
financial assistance from those that have emigrated. As of the mid-2000s, in some
countries in the region, remittances sent by migrants surpassed foreign aid budgets and
remittances matched the foreign currency states received from exports (Portes, Escobar
and Radford, 2007, 243-244). This has led countries to implement a wide range of
policies in order to attract and channel remittances (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003). The
financial power of emigrants of the Dominican Republic has been viewed as a major
reason why Dominicans were allotted the right to vote in elections while abroad, and why
they were granted the right to hold dual citizenship (Barry, 2006). Another important
reason why external voting has become so prevalent is the changing attitudes towards
emigrants.
Historically, once individuals left their country-of-origin they were no longer
considered to be a part of society, and those that emigrated were frequently portrayed
negatively by their home government. Emigrants were often cast as deserters that no
longer had an interest in their homeland, or even traitors (Gamlen, 2013). Countries were
subsequently deeply opposed to granting migrants political rights such as the opportunity
to vote from abroad and the opportunity to acquire dual citizenships. However, in the last
few decades, the relationship between migrants and their state of origin has been
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transformed significantly. Heads of states in many countries are now determined to make
a point by embracing their émigré population that had previously been forgotten by the
state (Ragazzi, 2009). Migrants are now more frequently viewed as being successful by
those in the homeland, and they are also viewed as being an important asset to export
values and practices that they have adopted in their host country (Fargues, 2011). This
change in the perception of migrants has in part led to the proliferation of states granting
political and social rights to those abroad. In fact, it might be considered that external
voting is becoming a democratic norm, which might explain the increase in countries
allowing for voting abroad, and why western democracies have started to encourage
emerging democracies to adopt external voting.
The international community has favored letting migrants vote in contentious
elections to give those elections more legitimacy. Migrants were given the chance to
vote in East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina because external voting was
seen as a step towards national reconciliation and being helpful to start the process of
building democratic institutions (Grace, 2007). Afghanis living in Iran and Pakistan were
ten percent of the electorate in the first elections after the fall of the Taliban regime
(Navarro, Morales and Gratschew, 2007), and Egyptians abroad were allowed to vote for
the first time in the parliamentary elections subsequent to the January 25, 2011 revolution
(El Baradei, Wafa and Ghoneim, 2012). After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Danish
government encouraged citizens of Iraq in Denmark to vote by subsidizing their travel
cost to get to a polling place (Thompson, 2007). These examples illustrate the rise of
external voting around the world. A few decades ago, it had only been implemented by a
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modest number of states, but now it is being recommended to the most volatile
“democracies” in the world, many of which are holding their first democratic elections.
It seems clear that the increase in international migration coinciding with
democratization has largely sparked the increase in migrants’ rights around the world
(Fierro, 2007). From 1910 to 2000, the estimated number of people not living in their
country of origin increased six times, while at the same time the earth’s population
increased by threefold (Benhabib, 2005, 673). This increase in international migration,
especially in certain areas such as Latin America and the Caribbean, is fundamentally
changing how states view citizenship, as it is becoming less based on territorial bounds
(Joppke, 2003; Escobar, 2007). It is understandable that states are being forced to rethink
their relationship with citizens living abroad due to the sheer numbers of citizens that
have emigrated.
In terms of population, New York City has the second largest number of
Dominicans in the world, second only to Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican
Republic (Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007). The global trend of migration has also
affected highly developed migration receiving states. It has been estimated that 5.5
million British citizens live permanently abroad, which is more than 9 percent of the
population, with another 500,000 people spending part of the year abroad (Sriskandarajah
and Drew, 2006, viii). In 2000, there were 70 countries where migrants accounted for 10
percent of the population, and there were six countries where migrants were more than 60
percent of the population (Braun and Gratschew, 2007, 2). Therefore, it is becoming
harder for states to ignore their emigrant population because of the number of emigrants.
Political parties have also become active in courting those living abroad.
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In February 2014, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan campaigned in
Germany, where it is estimated that more than 1.6 million Turkish citizens live, as
Turkey is set to implement external voting for the first time in 2014 (Wall Street Journal,
2014). Transnational political campaigns have been taking place in major cities of
migration destination countries for several decades. Mexican politicians have been
campaigning for the support of Mexicans living in the United States as early as 1929,
when José Vasconcelos, a leader of the Mexican Revolution, appealed for their support
while he was running for the presidency (Lafleur, 2011). In fact, before external voting
was adopted in Mexico,1 all the three main Mexican political parties frequently
campaigned in the United States, with some candidates handing out phone cards to
Mexican migrants living in the United States, asking them to call their friends and
families in Mexico and suggest that they vote for their party (Bada, 2003, 24). Politicians
from Haiti and the Dominican Republic have also frequently campaigned in the United
States, as leaders have started to view their emigrant community as a part of the nationstate (Sherman, 1999). Political candidates and parties do not only campaign abroad to
court votes and ask emigrants to try to persuade their relatives and friends in the
homeland to vote for them; they also request financial support.
It is when politicians are abroad that emigrants have the best opportunity to
request increased rights. During their trips abroad, politicians often make promises to
push for further rights but whether they follow up on their promise is often questionable.
African politicians frequently make trips abroad to ask for financial support. During
these trips, they often pledge that they will work on emigrant rights issues, but once they

1

The 2005 law that allowed for external voting in Mexico prohibited Mexican candidates and parties to
conduct any transnational campaigning.
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are back in the home country these promises frequently go to the wayside (Whitaker,
2011, 779). When Dominican politicians toured the United States asking for political and
financial support, they tended to be criticized by the migrants as they had not
implemented external voting (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008, 671). Political parties of the
Dominican Republic have been campaigning in the United States for decades, but since
the 1990s Dominicans living in the United States have become a key feature of the
political process (Itzigsohn et al, 1999), with financial contributions from the United
States having been estimated to be around fifteen percent of the parties annual
fundraising (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003). Although political parties see numerous
benefits in granting external voting and other political rights, there are several obstacles
that make it difficult to implement voting from abroad.
Whenever political candidates and parties participate in campaigning abroad, they
are breaching a long held international norm of not meddling in the politics of other
countries, by interfering with a population that is living in a different state (Gamlen,
2008b). Although the acceptance of external voting has significantly increased in the last
few decades, some countries are wary of having transnational electoral activity within
their borders. Switzerland used to prohibit foreigners to vote in foreign elections (Lacy,
2007). Canada does not want its territory to be considered as a part of another country’s
constituency (Lafleur, 2013b), and the Australian government has been against Australian
citizens running for a seat in the legislature of another country while they live in
Australia (Mascitelli and Battiston, 2009). Sometimes host governments also worry that
foreign electoral campaigns may introduce political and ethnic conflicts within a migrant
group (Sheffer, 2003; Bauböck, 2007), and that foreign political campaigns diminish the
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likelihood that immigrants will successfully assimilate in the host country (Bauböck,
2007, 2442).
Not allowing the emigrant population to vote in emerging democracies may
delegitimize the elections, especially if many migrated away from the country because of
political or religious reasons. But there are also several political and logistical problems
that are associated with implementing external voting (Grace, 2007), especially for
countries that do not have a long history of holding elections. In 2006, Ghana
experienced civil unrest after the country allowed external voting (Collyer and Vathi,
2007). There is also the problem of potential electoral fraud, as it can be difficult for
states to apply the same measures to prevent fraud abroad than it is within their borders.
When external voting was being debated in Mexico, the Mexican Federal Election
Institute, which is responsible for holding elections, warned that it might have problems
upholding the same standards abroad as it does in Mexico to ensure fair elections (Suro
and Escobar, 2006; Lafleur, 2013a).
Another problem with implementing external voting is the cost, as the cost per
voter tends to be higher for elections held abroad. The Mexican government ended up
spending over 27 million dollars but less than 33,000 Mexicans living abroad ended up
voting; therefore, the Mexican government spent around 850 dollars per vote abroad
(Lafleur, 2013a, 43). After the first implementation of external voting in Honduras, there
were also complaints due to the high cost of implementation. This led to critics
advocating for a repeal of voting abroad (Thompson, 2007). Colombia, which has a long
history of external voting, has been able to keep the costs lower. For the Colombian
Senate elections of 2002, the government set up 365 polling stations in 66 countries and
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kept cost at approximately two dollars per registered voter (de Acosta, 2007, 81). There
are also some that criticize the implementation of external voting regardless political
consequences.
In 2006, Italy and Mexico, two countries with a long history of emigration, both
implemented external voting for the first time, with very different political consequences.
Voters from abroad in Italy elected a senator that tipped the balance such that Silvio
Berlusconi’s coalition lost power (Lafleur, 2013a). Berlusconi ended up challenging his
defeat by questioning the legitimacy of those voting abroad. In Mexico, the legitimacy of
external voting was also questioned but because of the low turnout. Accordingly,
external voting can be contested both on the grounds that those abroad should not have
the chance to decide who governs, and that low turnout does not justify the high costs
associated with the implementation of external voting. In 2007, external voting was
abolished in Armenia, a country that has a population of approximately three million, but
with twice that number of Armenians living abroad (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010,
483). The right of Armenians was rescinded because of sentiments that only those in
Armenia should have the power to choose who governs their country (Fierro, Morales
and Gratschew, 2007). Another country that has abolished voting from abroad is South
Africa. This was done for political reasons at the end of apartheid in 1998, as it was
alleged that the government viewed its citizens abroad as being sympathetic to the old
apartheid regimes (Collyer and Vathi, 2007).
This thesis will attempt to do what King, Keohane and Verba see as important for
a good research project in political science (1994, 15). First of all, the research topic
under review has real world implication. There is a debate in many countries whether to
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adopt external voting, and in some places whether to abolish it. There are numerous
countries that are scheduled to implement voting from abroad for the first time in 2014,
including Costa Rica and El Salvador (Bravo, 2013). Secondly, I will make a
contribution to the scholarly literature on external voting by attempting to answer why
states adopt external voting in Latin America and the Caribbean. This study looks for
variables that increase or decrease the likelihood that a country will adopt external voting,
currently the reasons why external voting is adopted and implemented remain mostly
unclear (Lafleur, 2013a). Even though I am only studying countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean, there is a reason to believe some of the variables tested are also
relevant for the study of external voting in other regions.
The remainder of the study will be organized as follows. Chapter 2 will review
both the empirical and the normative scholarly literature on external voting. I will also
evaluate some of the most hypothesized variables that explain why states have started to
expand rights to their emigrants. Chapter 3 focuses on theory and the methodology that
will be used in the paper. Chapter 4 consists of a case study of Mexico which has
adopted and implemented external voting. Chapter 5 looks at Chile which has not passed
and external voting legislation. Chapter 6 examines the results from both the quantitative
sections and the two case studies. Chapter 7 will review the previous chapters and
present the conclusion of the study.
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Chapter 2:
The Expansion of Migrants Rights
In a 2007 study, Collyer and Vathi found that out of the 144 countries in their
sample, 115 nations had allowed their citizens abroad to vote in some manner (15).
Likewise, Navarro, Morales, and Gratschew (2007) established that a majority of states in
all the regions in the world now allow for voting abroad. However, despite the large
number of countries allowing for external voting, the scholarly literature on the topic has
been limited (Lafleur, 2011), and external voting remains a marginal topic in political
science. One possible explanation for the lack of scholarly attention on external voting is
that previous studies have tended to greatly underestimate how widespread voting abroad
is (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). Furthermore, the political science literature has tended to
focus on how migration affects migration receiving countries, while most governments
around the world tend to be more apprehensive about those that leave (Ragazzi, 2009).
When groups of emigrants leave in large numbers, they are often referred to in the
scholarly literature as a “diaspora”. For many decades the term diaspora was almost
exclusively associated with Jews dispersed around the world (Safran, 2005). Recently,
diaspora is turning more into a catch-all term (Faist, 2010). It can refer to Latinos around
the world that live outside of their homeland, Asian-Americans, Arab-Americans, and
members of transnational religions, or even to transnational groups that share the same
political ideology (Sheffer, 2003, 10). It is important to understand that many states do
view their emigrants as being the country’s diaspora because they have been forced to
leave their homeland in order to search for economic opportunities, or because of
mistreatment. When states reach out to their diaspora, it can be seen as a unifying
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measure, which shows that those who live abroad are still valued, and that the state would
welcome an eventual return to the homeland. Appealing to the diaspora can also be used
by emerging political forces that use the imagery of the diaspora, a group of people who
felt that they needed to leave their homeland to point out failures of previous
governments. The emergent “new left” in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador all
challenged old held notions of the nationhood (Elner, 2012), and, under Rafael Correa,
the Ecuadorian state has started using the slogan “Todos somos migrantes” (we are all
migrants) (Margheritis, 2011, 198). In this paper, I will stay away from the term diaspora
and also “expatriates” which refers to a citizen who leaves for a long time or permanently
from their homeland (Bauböck, 2007). Instead, I use the terms “migrants” and
“emigrants” as it refers to individuals that leave their country of citizenship without
specifying whether they intend to return or not.
Expanding Migrant Rights
It has been claimed that external voting goes as far back as the Roman Emperor
Augustus, when the members of the local senate in 28 newly established colonies had the
opportunity to vote for candidates for the city offices of Rome (Ellis, 2007, 41). But
historically, external voting is a fairly recent development and several countries that are
viewed as being strongly consolidated democracies did not adopt external voting until
fairly recently, such as Belgium (1999) and Japan (2002) (Ellis et al, 2007). External
voting started as a way to enfranchise those serving the state’s interest abroad.
Wisconsin allowed Union soldiers to vote in other U.S states during the American Civil
War2 (Ellis, 2007), and some small nations like Iceland allowed sailors and fisherman, its

2

Wisconsin is technically not an example of voting abroad since soldiers voted in other states within the
United States
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key economic constituency, the right to vote in the middle of the 20th Century (Braun and
Gratschew, 2007).
The United States followed the same path as many countries, by first expanding
external voting rights to those in the military during World War II, with the passing of the
Soldier Voting Act of 1942. Then in 1975, emigrants were granted the right to vote while
abroad when the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act was adopted (Rhodes and
Harutyunyan, 2010). Furthermore, in 1986 voting legislation was consolidated and
American citizens abroad were guaranteed the right to vote in all federal elections after
the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act was passed. Some U.S states
also allow overseas voters also to participate in both state and local elections (Green,
2007, 101). The United States government was less eager to expand the right of dual
citizenship to emigrants and immigrants. In 1967, the U.S Supreme Court forced the U.S
government to change its policies toward dual citizens, when it ruled that Beys Afroyim,
a naturalized citizen, had not given away his citizenship by participating in the 1951
Israeli elections as had been argued by the U.S State Department. The State Department
did not fully acknowledge the Court’s decision until 1990 when it directed its embassies
and consulates around the world to ease the process for dual citizens to retain their
American citizenship (Wucker, 2004).
Colombia was the first country in Latin America to pass an external voting
legislation in 1961 and implementing it in 1962 (de Acosta, 2007). Most countries in the
region that have adopted external voting have done so in the last thirty years. This
increase in external voting has been spurred on by democratization and the consolidation
of democracy in the region. Several countries have adopted external voting since the end
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of rule of Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay in 1989, and General Augusto Pinochet in Chile
in 1990, which marked the end of a long era of authoritarian rule in South America
(Munck, 2007). Furthermore, countries such as the Dominican Republic have adopted
and implemented external voting to illustrate that they are becoming consolidated
democracies (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008). Costa Rica and El Salvador will become
the most recent countries to implement external voting as they are scheduled to
implement it for the first time in 2014.
Migrants are able to achieve their goals of increasing their rights by participating
in political transnationalism which describes a wide number of activities that migrants
perform in two different countries. These practices include running across borders, and
lobbying their homeland governments for rights (Lafleur, 2008, 43). Itzigsohn et al
categorized transnational practices into four categories: political, economic, civil societal
and cultural practices (1999, 324). As should be expected the number of migrants who
are active in transnational border activism is small (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003;
Hickerson, 2012), as Robert Dahl explained “Even for someone to whom politics is
important, it is easier to be merely interested than to be active” (2005, 280). The
opportunity cost for those abroad is higher compared to those that live in their homeland.
Nonetheless, many emigrants are involved in transnational practices. For example, a
2006 survey of Peruvians living in Spain showed that 60 percent of those surveyed had
exchanged information and opinions on the 2006 elections in Peru with their friends and
family “back home” (Escrivá, Cruz and Bermúdez, 2010, 114).
The emergence of transnational practices are often explained because of
improvements in technology (Vertovec, 2003; Bauböck, 2005; Barry, 2006; Collyer and
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Vathi, 2007; Castro and Gonzalez, 2008; Fargues, 2011; Addis, 2012; Pogonyi, 2013).
The invention of new communication technologies and cheaper international phone rates
have made it much easier for migrants to be in contact with those in their country of
origin. Furthermore, migrants can now much more easily be informed on the news that is
taking place in their country of origin, as they can read news on the internet, or in some
cases watch the same news as their countrymen through satellite television. Therefore,
technology has made it easier for migrants to stay in touch with those still living in their
country-of-origin and to lobby governments for the expansion of rights.
In his book, Politics and the State. The External Voting Rights of Diasporas
(2013a) Jean-Michel Lafleur, a prominent author on external voting, points out three
different perspectives that studies on external voting have tended to follow. First,
scholars have looked at the expansion of external voting from a legal perspective which
sees changing norms and changing perceptions as the main explanatory reason why
external voting has occurred. Secondly, a portion of the scholarly literature has looked at
external voting through normative lenses. Finally, there is the socio-political approach
which has looked at what incentivizes states to implement external voting (2013a, 32).
Legal Perspective
Many scholars have seen the proliferation of external voting and other measures
that give rights to emigrants as a correlation to changing international norms. Rhodes
and Harutyunyan refer to this claim as the “global-norm hypothesis” (2010, 472). These
changes in norms are challenging the traditional Westphalain notion of citizenship and
sovereignty. Traditionally, states viewed it as a taboo to grant their citizens any rights
that could imply dual loyalties in any way. However, these long standing norms have
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started to change, as more countries have allowed their citizens to adopt dual citizenship
and external voting.
It is important to also look at the expansion of dual citizenship when studying
external voting. As states are faced with similar normative quandaries when deciding
whether to allow dual citizenship as when deciding whether to allow external voting. As
Szabolcs Pogonyi (2013, 4) has stated, “The growing toleration of dual citizenship is a
very important factor in the proliferation of external voting”. In the traditional view
individuals cannot have loyalty to more than one state, which is why states have been
opposed to dual citizenship (Bloemraad, 2004; Rubio-Marin, 2006; Lafleur, 2008; Spiro,
2010). There is also the question of how a person can fulfill some of their civic
responsibilities such as military service to more than one state (Sejersen, 2008).
However, in the last few decades, countries around the world have changed their attitudes
toward dual citizenship, and states have started to sanction it (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple,
2004). In a 2008 study of 115 countries, Tanja Sejersen found that in the 1980s less than
20 percent of the countries in her sample had allowed for dual citizenship, but in the last
two decades the number had significantly increased and a majority of countries now
allow for dual citizenship (2008, 542). Similarly, Cristina Escobar (2007) found that
Latin American countries have followed a similar trend in her study. Before 1991, only 4
countries in Latin America permitted dual citizenship but since 1991, 12 more Latin
American countries permitted dual citizenship (2007, 542). Furthermore, in 2000, at least
10 Caribbean basin countries allowed for dual citizenship (Levitt and De la Dehesa,
2003).
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Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010) make the argument that emigrant rights have
emerged in part due to changing international norms, and that the enfranchisement of
those abroad should be studied in the same context as how other excluded members of
society gained suffrage. Since World War II, democratic states started a slow-moving
transformation of expanding political citizenship3 to unrepresented groups such as
women and minorities. The inclusion of emigrants into the electorate has taken place
without international agreements legitimizing this new notion of citizenship. Only the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
specifically states that migrant workers should be permitted to vote in their state of origin
(Nohlen and Grotz, 2000, 1117). The Council of Europe has advised that emigrants
should have the right to vote abroad (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). Nevertheless, no shared
policy has emerged among European states on external voting, and the European Court of
Human Rights has ruled that the inability of Greeks abroad to vote in parliamentary
elections did not infringe upon their human rights (European Court of Human Rights,
2012). It is also possible to argue that external voting breaches the sovereignty of the
migrant receiving state (Gamlen, 2008b), since the sending state is extending rights to a
person living in another country.
States have often depicted their migrant population in a negative way. Robert
Muldoon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, from 1975-1984, stated that “New
Zealanders migrating to Australia raise the average IQ of both countries” (Gamlen, 2013,
238). The Mexican state portrayed its migrants in a negative manner during most of the

3

Political citizenship refers to the right to partake in the political process
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20th century, even using the derogatory term of “pochos”4 when referring to those that
had left (Lafleur, 2008). However, in the last few decades states worldwide have started
to portray their emigrants in a much more positive manner (Larner, 2007; Gamlen, 2013).
Since 2000, the Mexican state abandoned its long standing policy of limited engagement
with their migrant population living in the United States. Since then the Mexican state
has developed policies to improve its relationship with those that have left (Délano,
2009). The Mexican state has also started to portray their migrants as being a part of the
“Mexican global nation” (Smith, 2003), instead of being a group that the state has
forgotten about. New Zealand has also moved from portraying its migrant population in
a negative to a positive manner (Gamlen, 2013). Furthermore, the Philippines has started
to depict their emigrants as heroes (Rodriguez, 2002), and since 2003, India has started to
celebrate Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Day of Indians Abroad) which celebrates those living
abroad (Mani and Varadarajan, 2005).
The mass movement of people across borders can also be seen as defying the
traditional view of the nation state (Margheritis, 2011), and migration has forced states to
rethink their position on political citizenship. More people are now living transnational
lives, having families in more than one country. These developments have posed
problems to the old idea of the nation state (Sejersen, 2008). States must also determine
if citizenship should be rewarded on the basis of jus sanguinis, jus soli, or a mixture of
both.5 The creation of the European Union (EU) also helped transform the long held
belief of the nation state by removing barriers of movement within most of Europe. At
4

The term pocho can refer to “pathetic figures who do not fit in either the United States or Mexico” (Smith,
2003, 306), or for “Mexican American citizens considered as having forgotten their Mexican roots”
(Lafleur, 2008, 330).
5
Jus sanguinis refers to a policy where citizenship is awarded through a blood lineage (i.e. having a
parent(s) who are of a certain nationality). Jus soli bases citizenship on where a person is born.
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the beginning of 2009, it was estimated that 31.9 million foreign citizens lived in the 27
EU member states (Eurostat, 2010). Some estimate that in 2005 there were up to 190
million migrants in the world, and that the number of migrants has doubled since the
1970s (Braun and Gratschew, 2007, 2). Migration has certainly existed since the
beginning of human history; but, in the last few decades international migration has
increased in every region of the world (Hollifield, 2000). The number of people leaving
is creating an unprecedented challenge for states in Latin America and the Caribbean and
around the world (Thompson, 2007). Subsequently, several scholars have seen external
voting partly as a response to migration (Barry, 2006; Tager, 2006; Bauböck, 2007;
Fierro, 2007; Nohlen and Grotz, 2007).
Latin America has a history of being a region of destination countries, receiving
immigrants mostly from Europe. However, in the last few decades the region has
developed into a region of sending countries with large numbers of Latinos moving to the
United States (Pellegrino, 2000; Escobar, 2007; Durand, 2009). The number of Latin
Americans living in the United States went from 1 million in 1960 to approximately 8.5
million in 1990 (Pellegrino, 2000, 398). Many small cities have been hit hard by
emigration as a large percentage of the working age population has left (Margheritis,
2011). From 1997 to 2006, approximately 900,000 Ecuadorians or about 20 percent of
the economically active population left Ecuador (Antón, 2010, 269-270). The Caribbean
has followed a similar trend as Latin America, as emigration became common after a
period of population growth (Pellegrino, 2000). Although it is safe to assume that
emigration was mostly sparked because of lack of economic growth, there are also
examples in Latin America and the Caribbean where migration was caused because of the
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political regime in a country (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008). Latin America and
Caribbean countries have started to change their policies towards its migrants because of
perceived threats to their migrant population in host countries, especially in the United
States.
States need to tread carefully when they want to build a relationship with their
emigrant community especially in countries where their presence is contested by some
(Cano and Délano, 2007). Several nations in Latin America and the Caribbean have had
a history of pursuing a policy of non-intervention with its emigrant population as they did
not want to be seen meddling with a population living in another country. But many
states started to change their policy of non-intervention in the 1990s, because they felt
that the interests of their citizens were being threatened in the United States.
The anti-immigration laws that were passed in the United States during the 1990s
acted as an exogenous shock that forced Latin America and the Caribbean countries to
engage their migrants and adopt policies to protect them. One such exogenous shock was
Proposition 187 in California, which goal was to save money by cutting any rights
undocumented migrants had (Garcia, 1995). These laws pushed countries in the region to
swiftly change their policies (Escobar, 2007), and it also led states to become more
willing to expand political rights to their emigrant population. The Brazilian government
historically did not interact much with their emigrants, but this changed when claims
started in the local media that Brazilians living in Europe were being mistreated (Levitt
2001).
Policy makers as well and scholars have seen the influx of migrants as being a
challenge to the identity of destination states. As Samuel Huntington (2004, 2) stated,
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“In this new era, the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America's
traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin
America, especially from Mexico”. Additionally, former Republican Congressman Tom
Tancredo suggested that the amount a country receives from remittances from emigrants
in the United States should be subtracted from its foreign aid that it gets from the United
States (Wucker, 2004). Latin America and the Caribbean countries, especially those with
a large migrant population have had to be careful when they grant certain rights to
emigrants. For example, some feared that having long lines of Mexicans voting in the
United States might help anti-immigration forces spark xenophobic sentiments (Tager,
2006). Nevertheless, states have changed their long held policy of non-interventionism to
respond to perceived threats to their migrants.
Normative Perspective
A significant proportion of the external voting literature has looked at the subject
from a normative standpoint. With the proliferation of voting rights for emigrants around
the world, the debate over external voting has moved from a theoretical issue to
something that has real world political implications. Policy makers and scholars alike
must come up with answers to current normative question such as should Scottish
citizens living abroad have the opportunity to vote in the referendum whether Scotland
secedes from the United Kingdom?
A prominent argument made by migrants is that all adult citizens should have the
right to vote (Barry, 2006; Bauböck, 2007; Song, 2009; Honohan, 2011). It can also be
argued that a full universal suffrage must also include those that live abroad. Especially
since many have emigrated because they felt that they needed to leave, either in order to
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support themselves and their family, or because political or religious reasons. Letting
refugees vote can be seen as a central step in building democratic institutions and norms
in countries after a conflict. Denying those that have been forced to leave the right can
not only delegitimize the electoral process, but also provide an electoral advantage to
those that who favored the displacement policy (Grace, 2007). There is also the idea that
emigrants can help influence a peaceful regime change. Following Croatia’s
independence in 1991, 10 percent of the parliamentary seats were allotted to Croatians
who had recently returned from living abroad (Wucker, 2004, 44). Furthermore, some
make the argument that emigrants should be rewarded with voting due to the financial
contributions they make to their home country. While there remains doubt about the
exact money send home and that it varies between countries there is no question that
sending countries have started to rely on remittances being sent home. However, the
counter argument could be made that if financial contributions should count towards
voting rights then foreign investors might also ask for enfranchisement (Pogonyi, 2013).
The most prominent explanation why external voting might be opposed from a
normative standpoint is that emigrants do not live in the territory of the government they
are voting for, and therefore, they are not affected by certain laws and policies (Blais,
Massicotte and Yoshinaka, 2001; Bauböck, 2005; Rubio-Marin, 2006; Lafleur, 2008;
Song, 2009; Honohan, 2011). There is also the argument that emigrants are not
interested in the politics of their home state and therefore they should not have the chance
to vote. In 2006, a survey found that more 55 percent of Mexicans living in the United
Stated did not know that there was a Mexican presidential election scheduled for the
same year (Suro and Escobar, 2006, 1). An argument can also be made against external
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voting stating that the emigrant community is no longer in touch with the political and
societal issues in their home country (Østergaard‐Nielsen, 2003). The 2012 elections in
Venezuela is a good example of this political gap that can emerge between those living in
their country of origin and abroad. Hugo Chavez ended up winning the 2012 elections by
receiving 55 percent of the total vote, but he received less than 10 percent from electors
abroad, and only a little over two percent from Venezuelans living in the United States.6
Some have also pointed out that external voting might be bad in a normative sense
because there is a possibility that a person can cast more than one vote, one in their
country of origin and one in their host country (Tager, 2006; Bauböck, 2007; Addis,
2012).
Some scholars have made recommendations of who should have the right to vote
or how voting abroad should be implemented. Rainer Bauböck (2003), who is a wellknown scholar on migration issues, suggested that citizenship should not be automatically
transferred beyond the first generations of those born in a foreign country, and that
suffrage should not be extended to all those that are entitled to citizenship. Claudio
López‐Guerra (2005) recommended that countries implement electoral rules similar to
that of Canada and Australia, which rescind the right of emigrants to vote after they have
lived abroad certain number of years. López‐Guerra views this system as being superior
compared to the external voting rules used in the United States and France, where there
are no time restriction on how long emigrants can be away and still be eligible to vote.
It is debated what consequences migration has on sending and host countries, and
whether migration involves winners and losers, or if both set of countries gain from
6

http://www.cne.gob.ve/resultado_presidencial_2012/r/1/reg_000000.html Accessed February 15 th, 2014.
Interestingly, in New Orleans Chavez only received 0.60% of the votes (51 votes) while his main opponent
Henrique Radonski received 99.18% (8,375 votes)
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migration (Gamlen, 2008a). The traditional belief among scholars is that most people
emigrate from developing countries to developed countries because of lack of
opportunities in their homeland (Massey, 1998). The impact of migration will depend on
who leaves, as migrants are a diverse group of people consisting of both skilled and
unskilled workers and those that intend to stay temporarily and permanently (Bach,
2011). Migrants also leave their homeland for a various set of reasons whether it be
simply to find a better life or because of other, more somber circumstances (Addis,
2012). The relationship between those that migrate and their home country is likely to be
heavily dependent on who is leaving and their skill level and under what circumstances
they left
The relationship between a citizen and the state drastically changes when a person
becomes an emigrant. In most countries, emigrants are not expected to pay taxes, and
those that leave, especially for a long time, are likely to lose benefits from the state
(Collyer and Vathi, 2007). The relationship between emigrants and the government of
the sending state can be amicable when both parties share similar values and interest; but
that is often not the case, as the rapport between the two is often based on hostile feelings
and suspicion (Addis, 2012). If a mass exodus takes place during times of political or
religious persecution, then the state is likely correct in viewing those that have emigrated
as being hostile to their rule. Also, if a country has a history of a one party rule during
times of migration it can also be assumed that the migrants will be opposed to that party.
Migrants are also sometimes viewed as having voted with their feet, by leaving the
homeland and therefore, having given up their voice in matters relating to their home
country (Fox and Bada, 2008).
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It should be presumed that disinterest toward its migrant population is the default
position of the state because of normative and practical reasons (Bauböck, 2003, 709).
Nevertheless, the number of states creating government institutions to work with the
emigrant community keeps on growing, and as has been stated before, more and more
states are granting their emigrant population political citizenship. It should be considered
that for most developing states it would more than likely not be in the best interest of the
state if all the emigrants were to return. Although developing countries are concerned
about the brain drain that occurs from mass migration, they are also aware of the financial
benefits they receive in return, especially from remittances, but also from knowledge
transfers (Ratha, 2005). Migration can also benefit developing states as it can decrease
the number of the unemployed, and the social unrest that is often associated with having
high unemployment. Since a massive return migration might not be good for many
developing states, they might be more willing to extend certain rights to emigrants such
as external voting that can make them feel like they are a part of the homeland.
States have also adopted other measures to retain formal ties with their emigrants.
For example, the Mexican government trains teachers in the United States, and Mexicans
living in certain cities in the U.S are able to get a Mexican high school degree. The
Brazilian government has also implemented similar policies at a smaller scale towards its
emigrant population in Japan (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003). When states communicate
with their citizens’ abroad, they are also working with a group that is likely to push for
other measures than the citizens living in the country of origin.
All immigrants are emigrants and for many emigrants it is more important to
maintain a relationship with their homeland rather than their adopted home since they are
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unlikely to have any voice in their country of destination (Collyer, 2013), very few
countries in the world allow non-citizens to vote (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). As can be
expected the political priorities of emigrants are often different than from those living in
the homeland, emigrants are often not directly affected by many of the laws and policies
that are adopted in their country of origin. Some key rights emigrants lobby for are to be
able to keep social protection as well as economic rights, having the opportunity for dual
citizenship, and political rights.
An important concern for emigrants having left their country is still keeping
certain social and economic rights in their homeland. Those that leave seek to have the
right to buy property whether it is to invest, for family members, or in case they were to
return one day. It is not uncommon for migrants to invest in their homeland and some
even keep paying social benefits while they are living abroad (Pogonyi, 2013).
Therefore, emigrants often request that their states of origin allow them to have certain
toll exemptions and favorable investment rates (Østergaard‐Nielsen, 2003).
States do not tend to disqualify the populace from citizenship just because they
move to another country (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010), but they often do not allow
their citizen to acquire another citizenship. Having the right of dual citizenship is very
important to emigrants. Because dual citizenship also allows emigrants the opportunity
to engage in transnational practices, they can travel without restriction between their
country of origin and country of destination (Bauböck, 2003). Furthermore, if an
emigrant loses his or her citizenship they also lose the right of diplomatic protection from
their country of origin (Rubio-Marin, 2006).
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Emigrants also want to have fuller sense of citizenship by having the chance to
vote. A 2006 survey conducted by the PEW Hispanic Center of Mexicans living in the
United States found that 68 percent disagreed that elections in Mexico were not important
to them (Suro and Escobar, 2006, 3). Migrants also want the right to vote for symbolic
reasons. In his interview with Ecuadorians living in Italy, Paolo Boccagni (2011) found
that most people did not vote because of strong support for a party or a candidate, but
rather to carry out their duty as Ecuadorian citizens. Migrants also make the argument
that although they leave and settle in a different country they do not lose their sociopolitical connection with the homeland (Escobar, 2004; Lafleur, 2008).
Socio-Political Perspective
A persistent assumption in the scholarly literature is that states grant emigrant
political citizenship because of financial incentives, and that when countries grant
emigrants rights they can expect something in return (Collyer and Vathi, 2007; Gamlen,
2008a). Countries have also come to rely financially on their citizens abroad (Levitt,
2001; Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007; Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Hickerson, 2012),
which makes states more likely to grant emigrants political citizenship. Municipal and
federal governments are often mindful to keep their emigrant population content. As the
former governor of the Mexican state Zacatecas explained while talking about the
emigrant population, “if we depend on them economically, it would be the last straw not
to respect their rights!” (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003, 599). A Mexican hometown
association leader even suggested that remittances from the United States are averting an
outbreak of a civil war in Mexico (Tuman, 2009, 19). Local, municipal, and federal
governments have started establish policies to manage and maximize remittances of those
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abroad (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1997; Goldbring, 2002; Guarnizo; 2003;
Skeldon, 2008).
The Mexican state Zacatecas was the first to implement the 3X1 (Tres Por Uno)
program. The goal of the 3X1 Program is to encourage investment in the public and
social infrastructure in the migrant’s communities of origin. The program consists of the
government matching the amount sent by migrant organization by three to one (Durand,
2007; Meseguer and Aparicio, 2012). Numerous other Mexican states have adopted the
3X1 program, and in 2000, El Salvador launched a similar program to leverage
remittances for local development (Burgess, 2012). Many countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean have also become reliant on remittances as a source of foreign of
currency. Remittances are the second largest source of foreign income in Ecuador
(Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow, 2009). Some states have started to offer migrants a premium
exchange rates (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1997). They do this partly to increase
their foreign exchange reserve, which states can use to finance trade deficits and service
foreign debt (Barry, 2006). Remittances are also becoming a more important part of the
economy in many sending countries, such as Mexico, where the remittances being sent
back have skyrocketed in the previous decades, and few industries generate as much
revenue to the Mexican economy than those living abroad (Smith, 2003; Tager, 2006).
However, the importance of remittances is often best seen at the regional level, for
example, in the Mexican state of Michoacán remittances have been more than 15 percent
of the state’s gross domestic product (Lafleur, 2008). Remittances also highly impact
financial wellbeing in developing states at the micro level.
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Remittances have been seen as very efficient as they require no bureaucratic
action and they tend to go to those that need them the most (Airola, 2007). Many low
and medium income families in Latin America and the Caribbean are very dependent on
remittances sent by emigrants, as they are used for necessary expenses as well as to build
up savings accounts (Itzigsohn, 1995; Barry, 2006; Rubio-Marin, 2006). In Honduras,
remittances are sometimes referred to as the “economic mattress” (Thompson, 2007,
133), and remittances have been shown to increase schooling rates in Ecuador, especially
among girls, the poor, and those living in rural areas (Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow, 2009,
1150).
Nonetheless, the impact of remittances have also been debated by scholars
(Guarnizo, 2003). Ratha (2005) found that remittances are a stable source of foreign
currency for developing countries and are less volatile than other types of foreign capital,
while other scholars have questioned the reliability of remittances, and have argued that
remittances are highly dependent on economic and political circumstances (Itzigsohn,
1995; Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1997). Amuedo‐Dorantes and Pozo (2006) found
that receiving remittance appears to minimize the likelihood of business ownership in the
Dominican Republic. Furthermore, remittances tend to be unequally distributed within
countries (Fox and Bada, 2008; Lampert, 2009). The impact of remittances are clearly a
potential motivator for states to adopt external voting. Furthermore, emigrants can use
their financial support to pressure their family and friends to push for their
enfranchisement.
The globalized economy is an additional explanation why states might grant their
emigrant population political citizenship. States want to build a relationship with their
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emigrant population in order to acclimate to the knowledge-based global economy
(Larner, 2007), as well as to use the knowledge, skills, and connections of their emigrant
population to achieve economic growth. This strategy has been called the “globalization
adjustment” variable (Lafleur, 2013a). Gamlen (2013) saw the change in New Zealand’s
government policy as a direct result of the government wanting to incorporate its
accomplished emigrant population into the economy. Although on average the migrant
population from Latin America and the Caribbean tend to have less education compared
to some regions such as Asia (Kapur, 2001), migrants from Latin America and the
Caribbean are an asset to their governments as they have acquired assets and skills while
living abroad (Evans, 2000). States also see their emigrant population as ambassadors
and potential lobbying force.
It has been well documented that countries often want to use their emigrant
population to lobby for their home state’s interest while they are abroad (Escobar, 2007;
Gamlen 2008a; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Pogonyi, 2013). The Israeli lobbying
groups in the United States are the envy of many sending states who wish to have a
population that is able to influence the destination country in their favor. Mexico is
widely believed to have become more willing to work with their migrant community
abroad, and changed their attitudes towards dual citizenship because they wanted
Mexicans living in the United States to lobby the U.S government to let Mexico join the
North American Free Trade Agreement (Sherman; 1999; Fitzgerald, 2005; Barry, 2006;
Tager; 2006; Cano and Délano, 2007; Lafleur, 2008; Délano, 2009).
There is also a prominent hypothesis that states are more likely to enfranchise
those abroad if the migrant community is organized (Itzigsohn, 2000; Escobar; 2007;
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Lafleur, 2011). The adoption of external voting tends to take place over a period of
several years (Nohlen, and Grotz, 2007). During this time it is important that the
emigrants speak with a unified voice in order to achieve their goal. Furthermore,
whenever migrants organize they can also make more of an impact financially by
consolidating their investments or public works projects. However, there are also
examples of emigrant organizations developing a negative reputation. In Nigeria the
divisive politics of Nigerian emigrant organizations has been seen as damaging to
Nigerian unity (Lampert, 2009). Furthermore, migrant organizations in Mexico have
been accused of picking pet public work projects, such as building basketball courts that
are mostly used when they themselves come to visit instead of other more urgent projects
(Fox and Bada, 2008, 456).
When studying external voting, it is also important to mention the institutional
factors involved. There are great variations in how voting abroad has been implemented
throughout the world. The way electoral rules are set up can greatly influence voter
turnout of those abroad, and whether voters abroad are of political importance (Fox,
2005). It is most common that emigrants can only vote in national elections, although
there are some countries including France and some states in the United States which
allow those abroad to vote in local elections (Bauböck, 2007, 2429). Some political
parties have also started to let emigrants participate in the process of selecting candidates.
This includes the Democratic Party in the United States, which allows its members who
are abroad to play a part in nominating their presidential candidate, as they are allowed to
vote in primary elections (Lafluer, 2013b). Some countries have chosen to create special
districts for their emigrant population in the legislature. Having a reserved seat in the
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legislature for those abroad can help alleviate the concerns of political parties as it caps
the political power of those abroad, and at the same time, it also encourages emigrants to
vote as they know that they will be represented.
According to Fierro, Morales and Gratschew (2007), nine countries have set up
seats in their legislature that are reserved for those abroad. In Italy, external voters can
vote for 12 of the 630 seats in the House of Deputies and 6 of 315 members of the Senate
(Tager, 2006). Colombians abroad are given one of the five seats that have been set up
for minorities in the Colombian Chamber of Representatives (Nohlen and Grotz, 2007).
There are also examples of regional governments reserving legislative seats for
emigrants. The Mexican state of Zacatecas, where approximately half of the population
lives abroad, has reserved two seats in the state legislature (Barry, 2006). But
institutional constraints have also made it very difficult for emigrants to be relevant
politically in many countries.
Some countries, such as Bolivia, have set up restrictions to limit the political
importance of those abroad. In Bolivia, only citizens living in the four countries with the
highest number of emigrants can participate. None of these four countries can register
more than half of those voting abroad. And, the number of those abroad who register to
vote cannot be more than 10 percent of the voting population in Bolivia (Lafleur, 2013b).
In Peru, emigrants are placed into the same electoral districts as the capital Lima, where
around one third of every elector lives. This reduces the power of the emigrant vote
(Escrivá, Cruz and Bermúdez, 2010). Mexico is perhaps the most infamous example of
strict institutional constraints. The 2005 law that allowed for external voting, greatly
restricted who could vote and banned parties from campaigning abroad. These
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institutional constraints portray the complicated relationship between migrants and their
homeland.
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Chapter 3:
Theory and Methods
External voting has only recently started to gain traction among academics
(Lafleur, 2013b). Therefore, the literature on the topic is still developing, and the reasons
why external voting is adopted and implemented remain mostly unclear (Lafleur, 2013a).
Nonetheless, there have been many different explanations put forward to what reasons
motivate states to adopt and implement external voting. Vanessa Bravo’s (2013) study
on the future implementation of external voting in Costa Rica and El Salvador, in 2014,
shows how countries adopt external voting laws through different paths. In Costa Rica,
there was little resistance to granting those abroad voting rights, and the Costa Rican
Electoral Supreme Court was a main reason why they adopted the law. However, in El
Salvador it was the El Salvadorian emigrant community that pushed for the legislation
with opposition from the political parties (Bravo, 2013, 12).
The introduction of voting abroad varies greatly from country to country. In some
places it is has been easy to pass, but in other countries external voting is a very
controversial topic, and the political process to decide whether these laws should be
approved often take numerous years and sometimes decades (Nohlen and Grotz, 2000).
Nevertheless, the goal of the subsequent chapters is to see if countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean have features that increase or decrease their likelihood of adopting
external voting.
Prior studies of external voting have tended to use only one methodological
approach, this study is atypical in that it employs a quantitative analysis in addition to
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case studies.7 Furthermore, previous studies have almost unanimously focused on the
implementation, while this study looks at the adoption of external voting laws.
There are several reasons why a potential voter might be away from his or her
home country during elections including: vacation, studies abroad, and so forth.
However, most people who are not present during elections have emigrated, some with
the intention never to return while others anticipate returning home one day. In this
thesis, I will focus on emigrants and their relationship with the state and political parties
back in their country of origin. I use a broad definition for the terms “external voting”
and “voting abroad” stating that countries have external voting as long as all or some of a
country’s electors who are temporarily or permanently abroad have the chance to vote
outside of their national territory. This definition is almost identical to the one that is laid
out by the International Democracy Electoral Assistance (IDEA) handbook on external
voting (Braun and Gratschew, 2007, 8). This definition insists that voters must have the
right to vote outside the territory of their respective states, excluding embassies or
consulates. Therefore, the definition differs from those that view external voting as the
right to vote for non-resident citizens, even if the voting itself takes place within the
borders of the their country (Pogonyi, 2013, 3). Voting from abroad can also consist of
postal voting, online, or even a proxy vote just as long as those who are not in their
respective country have the chance to vote.
The time frame for this study is 1980 to 2012, and it includes countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean in accordance to how the World Bank classifies “Latin
America and the Caribbean”.8 However, 10 out of the 29 countries are dropped from the

7
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An extensive search of the literature has not turned up any works that combines both methods.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac
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study either because of lack of data9 or because they had adopted external voting laws
before 1980.10 Twelve countries adopted external voting at some time during the study;
none of the countries in this study have rescinded the rights of emigrants to vote abroad
after having passed external voting laws.
The relationship between several independent variables and the dependent variable
(adoption of external voting) will be tested using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model
(Cox, 1972). This model is frequently used in the social sciences (Beck, Katz, and
Tucker, 1998). The goal of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model is to measure failure,
which in this study, is operationalized as the adoption of external voting. The Cox
Proportional Model is especially useful to measure policy adoptions (Jones and Branton,
2005, 424), and various studies have used this model to do so (Langer and Brace, 2005;
Murillo and Martínez‐Gallardo, 2007; Romanosky, Telang and Acquisti, 2011).
Dependent and Independent Variables
The dependent variable Adoption of External Voting refers to whether a country
has passed legislation allowing for citizens who are abroad to vote outside of their
respective country’s territory (excluding embassies and consulates), or in any other rare
circumstances which allows for external voting. This includes for example, situations
when external voting has been adopted because of decisions in the judiciary or through an
executive decree. The information on whether a country has adopted external voting
laws or not, and in what year it was passed, are taken mostly from the IDEA’s website
section on voting abroad11 and other academic sources (Navarro, 2007; Thompson, 2007;

9

This includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
10
This includes: Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, and Peru
11
http://www.idea.int/elections/vfa_search.cfm#
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Bravo, 2013). All countries are coded 0 until they adopt external voting, once they have
adopted the law they are coded as 1 and dropped from the sample.
The studies that discuss the importance of remittances on sending countries are
numerous (Itzigsohn et al, 1999; Itzigsohn, 2000; Bauböck, 2003; Joppke, 2003; Wucker,
2004; Fitzgerald, 2005; Ratha, 2005; Barry, 2006; Tager, 2006; Cano and Délano, 2007;
Escobar 2007; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Sejersen, 2008; Margheritis 2011; MataCodesal, 2011; Hickerson, 2012 ). Many scholars point to remittances as a key incentive
for states to increase the rights of those living abroad (Barry 2006; Cruz, 2007; Sejersent,
2008). The theory posits that states adopt external voting as they wish to please those
abroad to keep the remittances coming. Furthermore, through their financial support
emigrants also can pressure their family and friends to push for their enfranchisement.
However, the impacts remittances have on external voting still remain questionable. In a
2007 study, Collyer and Vathi found that remittances and external voting were not
correlated. However, Collyer and Vathi’s study compared some of the richest and
poorest countries in the world. Many of the most developed countries in the world have
also adopted external voting although remittances have little influence on their economy.
In order to examine the importance of remittances in each country, I divide the
dollar figure of the remittances by the growth domestic product (GDP) of each country
and employ remittances as a percentage of GDP for each country during the time period
of my study. The data on GDP and remittances is taken from the World Bank (n.d.). The
impact of remittances have been found to be nonlinear, where the inflow has a weaker
impact after it reaches a certain level (Chami, Hakura and Montiel, 2009). Therefore,
remittances as a percent of GDP squared is also employed in the model in order to
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capture a potential nonlinear relationship. It is likely that countries will try to restrict the
power of its emigrant community if they deem them too have the potential to be too
powerful. Using the squared form of remittances as a percentage of GDP is also
important for the nonlinearity in the parameters of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model
(Keele, 2005, 3).
The problem with the data from the World Bank on remittances is that it only
accounts for money that is sent through official channels, and it is widely known that part
of the money that emigrants send home go through unofficial channels (Levitt, 2001;
Skeldon, 2008). It is my hope that this bias is distributed equally among all countries.
Some have used the number of Western Union agencies per capita as a way to measure
remittances (Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow, 2009; Antón, 2010), but this data is
unfortunately not publicly available for all the countries in the study. Furthermore,
looking at the number of Western Union agencies per capita also presents a bias, as
Western Union might have a higher market share of the remittance sent in some countries
than others, where other companies might have a stronger presence.
Hypothesis 1: Countries with a higher percentage of remittances measured as a
percentage of GDP are more likely to adopt external voting.
Hypothesis 2: The impact of remittances as percent of GDP is nonlinear, after
accounting for a topping point the effects dissipates
I will also test the relationship between the level of democracy and the likelihood
a country will adopt external voting. There is obviously a link between democracy and
voting. However, there is a chance that countries adopt external voting for symbolic
reasons to portray themselves as being more democratic than they actually are. The King
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of Morocco decided that Moroccan emigrants would have the chance to vote in the 2007
elections despite Morocco being in essence an absolute monarchy, where the King is the
final decision maker (Collyer and Vathi, 2007, 5). Some have seen external voting as the
next step towards reaching universal suffrage (Nohlen and Grotz, 2000), others view
external voting as a step towards democratic consolidation (Pogonyi, 2013).
Nonetheless, external voting has not been recognized as an essential part of democratic
governance.
Freedomhouse gives an annual score for political rights and civil liberties for each
country ranging from 1 (most free) to 6 (least free). The advantages of Freedomhouse
compared to other indexes such as the Polity index is that Freedomhouse includes several
smaller nations in Latin America and the Caribbean that the Polity index does not. To
code the level of democracy, I use the mean for the political rights and civil liberties
score.
Hypothesis 3: Countries with a lower combined Freedomhouse political and civil
rights score are more likely to adopt external voting.
It is clear that both left and right leaning governments around the world have
adopted and implemented external voting. In addition, there is no research that suggests
clear ideological preference among emigrants. However, Latin America has a history of
persecution of leftist political forces after there were numerous right wing coups in the
region in the 1970s and 1980s (Arditi, 2008). Authoritarian regimes in countries such as
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Paraguay and Uruguay were a major driver for many
emigrating (Pellegrino, 2000). Many leftist were also forced to leave their countries as
civil wars broke out. In El Salvador, the civil war led to over a million people leaving
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their country (Wright and Moody, 2005), and in Guatemala a civil war led to a mass exile
of political refuges to go to Mexico and the United States (Tuman and Gerhart, 2010).
The left leaning parties in Latin America also have the history of being the ones that have
pushed for expanding enfranchisement (Smith, 2011). The scholarly literature has also
showed that leftist forces in numerous countries have started using the imagery of their
“diaspora” in their political message of inclusion (Margheritis, 2011; Ellner, 2012; Bravo,
2013).
Additionally, since emigrants tend to leave because of lack of economic
opportunities I hypothesize that left leaning parties will be more likely to see political
gains from adopting and implementing external voting. The data for the orientation of
the executive comes from the Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset, 19452008 (Huber, Stephen and Mustillo, 2012). The dataset codes the leaning of the
executive in 14 different ways. I code leftist orientation as a binary variable, with secular
left, secular center left, Christian left, and Christian center left being coded as having a
left leaning executive.
Hypothesis 4: Countries with a left leaning executive are more likely to adopt
external voting
External voting legislation tends to arise from the negotiation among the main
political parties (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011). I find it most likely that the adoption of
external voting will take place whenever the major parties have a relatively similar share
of seats in the legislature. As Barbara Geddes states” (1) reforms are more likely to pass
the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the strongest parties,
and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extensions of reform
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where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even and stable” (Geddes,
1991, 371). In order to test for power among the strongest parties I use data from the
Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2008 (Huber, Stephen and
Mustillo, 2012). Hypothetically, this data can range from zero (the party of the executive
has no seats in the lower house) to 100 (the party of the executive has all the seats in the
lower house).
Hypothesis 5: Countries that have equilibrium of seat share in the lower house of
the party of the executive are more likely to adopt external voting.
Another potential reason why countries in Latin America and the Caribbean adopt
external voting is because of diffusion from neighboring states. Local politics are often
influenced by what occurs in their neighboring countries (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006;
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2007). As Kurt Weyland has stated “A bold reform
adopted in one nation soon attracts attention from other countries, which come to adopt
the novel policy approach. As such a wave gets under way, innovations often spread
quickly to other countries following the trendsetter” ( 2005, 262). In order to code
diffusion, I take the percentage of each country neighbors that have adopted external
voting laws per year. Therefore, the higher percentage of neighbors that have adopted
external voting the more likely nations are to adopt external voting. The data whether or
not a country has adopted external voting is taken from the same sources as the
dependent variable, the IDEA’s website12 and from Navarro (2007) Thompson (2007),
and Bravo (2013).
Hypothesis 6: Countries are more likely to adopt external voting if they border a
high percentage of countries that have adopted external voting.
12

http://www.idea.int/elections/vfa_search.cfm#
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Adoption of external voting does not necessarily mean that a government intends
to implement them. A state can adopt the legislation but not have any intentions to
setting in place the mechanism needed to allowing those abroad to vote. Belize was one
of the first countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to pass external voting
legislation in 1978, and added the provision needed to implement external voting in
199813, but Belize has still not yet implemented the law (IDEA, 2014). After a country
adopts external voting there are still numerous obstacles before implementing voting in a
foreign territory. First of all, external voting tends to be expensive. Secondly, countries
must have the structural and technical capabilities to implement external voting while
safeguarding its electoral process. I expect countries that have a high GDP are more
likely to adopt external voting as they are more likely to have the capabilities to actually
implement them. The data for GDP in constant dollars comes from the World Bank. The
GDP is logged in order to control for a large difference in GDP size among countries in
the sample.
Hypothesis 7: Countries with a high GDP are more likely to adopt external
voting.
It has also been suggested that norms are the key reason why countries try to keep
relationship with its emigrant community (Gamlen, 2008a). Because of the globalization
of international norms, “new international norms have also taken hold which make this
shared policy repertoire something that is expected by emigrants and states alike” (Lewitt
and de la Dehesa, 2003, 599). In the last thirty years the number of countries allowing
for external voting has increased exponentially. Political globalization is something that
is truly difficult to quantify, but the KOF political globalization is supposed to do just
13

Belize was coded as having adopted external voting in 1998
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that. The index gives a score from zero (lowest level of political globalization) to
hundred (highest level of political globalization) yearly from 1980 to 2010. The index
does so by looking at the number of embassies a country has, the number of international
organizations the country is a member of, number of United Nations peace mission the
country has taken part in to name a few and few other criterions.
Hypothesis 8: Countries with a high level of political globalization are more
likely to adopt external voting.
Case Studies
In addition to the quantitative chapter explaining why states adopt external voting
this project will also include case studies of Mexico and Chile. The potential political
cloud of Mexican emigrants has the possibility to have a tremendous impact on Mexican
politics. The possible impact of Mexicans abroad was one of the main reasons that kept
the Mexican political parties from coming to an agreement on an external voting
legislation, and led to an external voting bill being passed that made it very difficult for
Mexicans abroad to vote. The second case study is Chile, which has not yet passed a
voting from abroad legislation. External voting is an important topic in the political
agenda of Chile. However, institutional factors dating back to the rule of Augusto
Pinochet have made it difficult to get any external voting bill passed. Despite the
importance of external voting in the political landscape there has been very little
scholarly literature that has focused on the struggle of Chileans abroad to have the right
to vote, and virtually no scholarship exist on the topic in the English language.
When analyzing the case studies, I will focus on the interplay of actors that other
scholars have viewed as important when it comes to adopting external voting laws. José
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Itzigsohn has come up with the three key actors: “the state apparatus of the country of
origin; the political parties of the country of origin; and migrant organizations in the
country of reception” (2000, 1126). Christina Escobar has come up with the same
political factors influencing the outcome: “the state, the political parties, and the
immigrant community—and their interplay in both the country of origin and the country
of residence” (2007, 44).
Migrant organization play a very important role in trying to get external voting
passed and implemented as they can help those living abroad speak in a more unified
voice. They also can have a strong negotiating position with the state in and in some
instances political parties by threatening to stop sending back remittances and other
financial assistance (Itzigsohn, 2000). Furthermore, migrant organizations can influence
politics by encouraging family and friends to vote in a certain manner. However, the
power of migrant organizations to influence politics back home often varies greatly
between countries, and sometimes within regions of countries (Tuman, 2009). Migrant
organizations are often ignored by their homeland (Østergaard‐Nielsen, 2003). The
power of migrant organizations can also be dependent in which destination country they
are located in, as involvement in migrant organizations is seen in some countries as not
assimilating (Wucker, 2004). I expect that external voting is more likely to occur in
countries that have strong and organized migrant organization living abroad.
Political parties are certainly most interested in doing what will benefit them
mostly politically. If a political party views migrant as being favorable to their opinions
they are likely to support external voting, “Individuals and parties who must compete in
electoral contests may advocate the expansion of the electorate in order to advantage their
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own political fortunes” (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010, 473). In Colombia, for
example, the political parties were the main drivers for allowing Colombians to have the
opportunity to vote abroad, and there has been smooth transition of incorporating the
emigrant community in the political process (Escobar, 2007). On the contrary, if a
political party believes that they will not benefit from external voting then it is only
rational for them to be opposed it. As Barbara Geddes has stated while discussing the
adoption of administrative reforms in Latin America “To explain why reforms have
occurred at some times and places but not others, then, one must answer the question,
Under what circumstances will the benefits of reform outweigh the costs to the politicians
who must at least acquiesce in passing them?” (Geddes, 1991, 373). External voting is
likely to be adopted in countries where it is believed that external voting will not give any
political movement a clear advantage, or when a new political force comes to power.
Since many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have become heavily
reliant on remittances it can be expected that states are likely to favor external voting in
countries that receive much financial support from those that live abroad. However, the
willingness of states to adopt external voting is likely to be minimized if those that left
are seen as being likely to oppose the current government (Wucker, 2004). For example
the Cuban state does accept remittances of its emigrants, however, it is clear that the
Cuban government has no intention of letting those abroad to play any role in the politics
of Cuba (Itzigsohn, 2000, since most emigrant would certainly oppose the Cuban
government.
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Chapter 4:
The Struggle for Suffrage for Mexican Abroad
The first large groups of Mexican immigrants in the United States were a result of
two treaties signed in the middle of the 19th century, the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo
and the Gadsden Purchase. These treaties led Mexico to lose about half of its territory to
the United States, and around 75,000 Mexicans decided to stay put in what was now the
United States (Cano and Délano, 2007, 698). Since then, the migration flow from Mexico
to the United States has been consistent. However, since 1980, an unprecedented number
of Mexicans left to the United States, as Mexico struggled through a long and difficult
political and economic transformation (Goodman and Hiskey, 2008). In the beginning of
the 21st century, emigration from Mexico to the United States was the largest bilateral
migration flow between any two countries in the world (Pellegrino, 2000). Around ten
percent of all those born in Mexico currently reside in the United States (PérezArmendáriz and Crow, 2010, 126).14 Therefore, the potential political impact of
Mexicans living abroad is enormous, as the Mexican population living in the United
States represents approximately 14 percent of the entire Mexican voting population, if
citizenship would be the only requirement to be eligible to vote (Bada, 2003).
The Battle for Suffrage
Mexicans living in the United States have expressed their desire to vote in their
home country’s elections since the late 1920s (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). In addition,
Mexican politicians have been campaigning for the support of Mexicans living in the
14

Although in the past few years, in large part due to economic recession, the migration flow to the United
States from Mexico has slowed considerably, and there may even be a reverse net return migration from the
United States to Mexico (Passel et al. 2012).
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United States as early as 1929, when José Vasconcelos, one of the leaders of the Mexican
Revolution, appealed for their support while he was running for the presidency (Lafleur,
2011). After Vasconcelos’ campaign failed, the issue of external voting became dormant
for decades, as the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) opposed reforms,
fearing an anti-PRI response from voters abroad (Smith, 2008). It was not until 1988,
when Cuahtémoc Cárdenas split away from the PRI to start the Partido de la Revolución
Democrática (PRD), that the issue of external voting once again came to the forefront.
Cárdenas looked for support from Mexicans in the United States as he ran for the
presidency and Cárdenas asserted that he would support the cause of migrants in the U.S
(Waldinger, 2008). He ended up losing the 1988 elections, but there were widespread
claims of electoral fraud. The uproar after the 1988 elections led the PRI to negotiate
electoral reforms which led to the creation of the Mexican Federal Election Institute
(IFE), an independent institution that monitors Mexican elections (Berruecos, 2003).
Signs of real reform started when the PRI’s power started weakening, and in
2000, when Vicente Fox from the center-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) was
elected, one of Fox promises was to enact voting from abroad (Lafleur and Chelius,
2011). On the day after his inauguration, President Fox had more than a hundred
representatives of Mexican emigrants living in the United States to celebrate his victory,
and Fox pledged that he would be the President of all Mexicans both those living at home
and abroad (Bada, 2003). President Fox enacted several measures to strengthen the ties
between those living abroad and the homeland (Lafleur, 2011). However, Fox had trouble
passing an external voting bill as the Mexican Congress dismissed or rejected several
bills. Therefore, Fox asked his Undersecretary of Political Development to come up with
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a compromise that would satisfy all the three major political parties (Lafleur and Chelius,
2011). This led to the electoral law legislation in 2005, which opened up the possibility
for Mexicans to vote abroad in the 2006 presidential elections. However, the 2005
legislation turned out to be a watered down version of external voting that minimized
political risks for all of the political parties involved. Political parties were forbidden to
campaign outside of Mexico, Mexicans living abroad could not financially support
candidates, and the cost of voting became very high. This chapter examines the political
process that led to the legislation that was passed in 2005 with near unanimous support in
the Mexican Congress. This legislation has been seen by many Mexican migrant leaders
living in the United States as a great disappointment. I argue that the three major Mexican
political parties took a rational choice to purposefully enact a weak external voting law in
2005 in order to preserve the status quo. The political parties felt that putting several
million new voters on the voter registration was too risky.
Political Actors Involved
It is interesting to look at the political process that took place in Mexico through
the behavior of the key actors at stake. As has been previously stated, this case study will
focus on the role of the state, migrant organizations, and political parties. In the case of
Mexico it can be argued that all three actors are strong. Many of the migrant’s
organizations are active and well organized, and the emigrant community in the United
States has the history of impacting domestic Mexican politics (Pfutze, 2007). In Mexico,
there has been a special relationship between the state and the political parties, as there
has been a certain level of a union between the state and the PRI, so much so that it can
be difficult to see where the state begins and where the PRI ends. The PRI had a
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monopoly of power for seventy-one years; for much of its time in power, elections were
mere rituals that consisted of opposition parties in large part as a symbolic measure
(Schedler, 2000). Many scholars and officials used to refer to the PRI as “el partido del
gobierno” or the party of the government (Rodriguez and Ward, 1994). However, it has
also been argued that this might not be truly the case; “the overlap between the PRI and
the government in Mexico has often been overstated. In many respects the government
(especially at the federal level) traditionally exercised a relative autonomy from the party,
in part, of course, in order to sustain the overall hegemony of the PRI” (Rodriguez and
Ward, 1994, 164). The opposition parties, the PRD and the PAN have not been able to
get to the same level of organization and power throughout Mexico as the PRI (Harbers,
2012), although the PAN did win two consecutive presidential elections in 2000 and
2006.
Role of the Mexican State
The Mexican state did have legitimate concerns not to extend the right to those
living abroad. However, there is also the suspicion that the Mexican state opposed certain
measures to protect the PRI. IFE’s Committee of Experts had stated that it was feasible to
conduct voting from abroad for the 2000 elections, but it was blocked as the PRI opposed
the measure (Smith, 2008). For the 2000 elections the Mexican state did end up setting
up polling stations along the border between Mexico and the United States, but officials
knew that most Mexicans abroad would not be able to go home and vote. Furthermore,
those who did cross the border found out that many polling stations had quickly run out
of ballots (Lawson, 2003). Many Mexican officials were also worried about the practical
consequences of adding millions of new potential voters to the registries, both because of
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its high cost and the difficult logistical problems that are associated with external voting
(Lafleur, 2011). There were those who were afraid of ballots coming from abroad might
be susceptible to fraud, which could change election results due to the large number of
Mexicans living in the United States (Marcelli and Cornelius, 2005). The ruling PRI
continually made the argument that external voting might open up the possibility of
electoral fraud, but in reality, the PRI was highly motivated by the potential negative
political consequences of giving the Mexican emigrant community suffrage (Smith,
2003). Officials also feared that external voting might create a backlash from the United
States (Smith, 2003). The loyalties of immigrants have long been questioned, and if the
public saw Mexicans as primarily interested in the well being of their former home
country, it might cause some anger among the American public (De la Garza, 1998).
Mexicans were allowed to become dual citizens in 1997 (Goldbring 2002), as the
Mexican government hoped that allowing Mexicans to become U.S citizens would help
Mexico in two ways. First, Mexicans could become a more influential force in American
politics, as some would have the right to vote. The Mexican state realized that a
politically active Mexican emigrant population in the United States might be able to push
for legislations that are favorable to Mexico. Secondly, it would help make sure that
remittances and capital coming from Mexican nationals abroad would not cease (Escobar,
2007, 54). Remittances are a major source of income for the Mexican economy, and in
many rural areas remittances exceed the budget of state and local governments (Bada,
2003). It has been estimated that over one million families in Mexico receive money from
remittance (Goldbring, 2002).
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Although the PRI adamantly opposed external voting while it was in power, the
Mexican state under its rule did enact several programs which Mexican migrants living in
the United States wanted. In 1989, the Paisano program was started with the goal of
reducing shame against Mexicans who choose to return back to Mexico. The PRI also
created the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) in order to improve its
relationship with Mexicans living abroad (Lafleur, 2008).. Furthermore, the Mexican
state also started playing a role in organizing civic events for Mexicans in the United
States by registering more than five hundred new community organizations and
organizing sports leagues for emigrants in the United States (Smith, 2003).
Once the PAN’s Vicente Fox became the president of Mexico in 2000, the
relationship between the state and the emigrant community improved. Fox was well
aware of the consequences of migration as he was the former governor of the migrant
sending state Guanajuato. Once Fox came into power, he tried to redefine the image of
Mexicans living abroad in a more positive manner (Lafleur, 2008). Furthermore, shortly
after being elected, Fox met with business leaders in the United States in order to
negotiate lower rates on money transfers (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003).
Role of Mexican Migrant Organizations
Jean-Michel Lafleur has suggested that there are two important ways in which
migrant organizations can push the state and political parties to enfranchise citizens
abroad. The first is that migrants need to act in unity to push authorities to implement
external voting. The second is that economic, political, and social influences from
migrants on their home country can sway policy makers (2011, 483). The Mexican
migrant organizations in the United States are a strong fit to both of the factors that
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Lafleur sees as being important. There are several ways in which migrants living abroad
can influence policies in their country of origin, such as, investing in their country of
origin, sending remittances, calling their friends and relatives back home in order to
influence their political behavior, and by organizing initiatives while abroad (PérezArmendáriz and Crow, 2010). The lobbying of Mexican migrant organizations has paid
off as they have been able to at least achieve partial victories on several of their key
issues including dual citizenship and external voting (Fierro and Carillo, 2007; Lafleur,
2008). There are Mexican hometown associations (HTA) spread out throughout the
United States that are active in encouraging development in Mexico and improving the
rights of Mexicans living abroad, as well as helping Mexicans to participate in Mexican
elections (Tuman, 2009). The number of HTAs has grown rapidly in the past few
decades, with a high concentration of migrants coming from the center-west area of
Mexico (Burgess, 2012). However, it is not appropriate to lump all the HTAs together as
they have both diverse goals and they have had different results in achieving their goals.
Not all the migrant organizations have the same objectives. Historically, the HTA
from the state of Zacatecas have focused on receiving official recognition from the
Mexican. Zacatecans have also focused on local politics by trying to influence the
political process in Zacatecas and getting resources from their home state (Smith, 2003).
On the other hand, HTAs from Oaxaca have tended to focus their attention on getting the
United States and other international human rights regimes to help protect Oaxacans
living in Mexico (Smith, 2003). Some states have been able to push their home states to
accept or at least consider proposals that allow group members to vote in local elections
and even run for office. Zacatecas and Michoacán are examples of states that have
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considered legislation to allow Mexicans living abroad the chance to vote in statewide
elections (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). The governor of Zacatecas also used to make
annual visits to the Mexican consulates in Los Angeles, where the governor brought his
or her key cabinet ministers and discussed key issues that Zacatecans living abroad might
have (Smith, 2003). There has also been variations on how politically active and
successful the migrants groups have been to get their states to implement favorable
policies, and there is also a large gap in where remittances are being sent back.
One possible explanation to why some HTAs have been more successful than
others is to look how much the local and state economies are dependent on remittances
and other forms of capital coming from abroad. Remittances from Mexicans abroad are
highly concentrated in a relatively few states (Fox and Bada, 2008). There is no denying
the enormous impact that migrants living abroad have on communities throughout
Mexico. Donations from HTAs often equal the public works budget of local
governments, especially in small towns (Orozco and Lapointe, 2004).
Both state and federal administrations have looked to Mexicans living abroad to
help them improve the living conditions of communities in Mexico (Goldbring, 2002).
Remittances sent back to Mexico are in the billions of dollars and Mexico receives by far
the most amount of remittances of any Latin American and the Caribbean country.
Migrant organizations have worked with several levels of governments to set up
programs such as the 3X1 Program, in which the state and local government match 3
pesos in public work for every peso sent by migrants (Meseguer and Aparicio, 2012).
Mexicans living abroad have argued that they should be able to vote in Mexican
elections due to the fact that they are helping development, and that the Mexican
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economy is dependent on remittances (Waldinger, 2008). Migrant organizations started
lobbying the Mexican government for the right to vote abroad in the 1980s, but the 2005
legislation did not meet what the HTAs wanted. The HTAs would have preferred less
institutional restraints and many wanted there to be a special electoral district for those
living abroad, like there is in Colombia and several other countries (Lafleur and Chelius,
2011).
Role of the Mexican Political Parties
Political parties tend to be the actors who have the strongest interest in opposing
external voting reforms because of the uncertainty they bring to them; this was certainly
true in the case of Mexico. The PRI was the party which opposed electoral reforms for
those living abroad while the PRD and PAN at least stated publicly that they were in
favor of external voting (Bada, 2003). However, the PRI was in power until 2000, so it
was able to block any reforms that the minority parties might have wanted.
It is useful to look at the political process that took place in Mexico through the
lens of rational choice theory. As Barbara Geddes has stated while explaining the process
of administrative reforms in Latin America (1991, 371), “incentives facing the politicians
who must initiate reforms if any are to occur, yields two predictions: (1) reforms are more
likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the
strongest parties, and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further
extensions of reform where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even
and stable”. The process described by Geddes does fit Mexico quite well. Reforms were
not made until there was more of a balance of power between the PRI and the two other
major parties. While the PRI was in control, it had no interest in extending voting rights
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to those abroad. Once the PAN had won the presidency, the PRI was more willing to
compromise.15 The PAN and the PRD publicly advocated for external voting, but at the
same time both of the opposition parties had some doubts about what might happen if
those electoral reforms were passed (Lafleur, 2011). What might explain the behavior of
the PRD and PAN is that they were supportive of electoral reforms for electoral gains,
but at the same time they were worried that in the long run they would not gain any
benefits (Bada, 2003).
While in power the PRI played a twofold game: trying to actively court the
migrant population, but at the same time preventing any reforms from being made. While
it controlled both the presidency and the Mexican Congress, the long-ruling PRI
adamantly opposed external voting, fearing that those who left for the United States had
already voted with their feet (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). Although there is no reason
to think that most Mexicans emigrate for political motives, there is some reason to
believe that migrants from Mexico harbor negative feelings toward the PRI (PérezArmendáriz and Crow, 2010), since most migrants had voted with their feet by
emigrating under the rule of the PRI (de la Garza, 1998, 432). The PRI had serious
trepidation that electoral reforms would mean growth for the opposition parties,
especially the PRD, since the PRD was the only party that had successfully cultivated an
important potential constituency abroad (Escobar, 2007). The opposition of the PRI

15

When the legislation passed in the Mexican lower house (Cámara de diputados) in June 2005, the PRI
held 224 of the 500 seats. The PAN held 149 seats and the PRD 97. Information can be found by going to
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/Votaciones.htm. Then click on the Primer periodo extraordinario Junio 2005
which is located under the information of the LIX Legislatura (2003-2006). Then click on votación for bill
number1785-III, martes 28 de junio de 2005. Information accessed April 3, 2014.
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against external voting continued throughout the 1990s until a compromise was reached
after President Fox was elected (Lawson, 2003).
At the same time, the PRI was opposing extending suffrage to those living abroad
it was also actively courting the migrant community in the United States (Pfutze, 2007).
The PRI had lobbied migrant organizations to support the party and it had also installed
committees of sympathizers in several U.S states (Bada, 2003). The PRI used several
tactics to get support from migrants in the United States, such as buying radio advertising
slots and requesting that migrants ask their relatives in Mexico to support the PRI (Smith,
2003). The PRD and PAN persistently supported external voting publicly, but there is
still some debate whether they actually wanted those living abroad to have the right to
vote.
In the decades prior to the voting abroad legislation being passed in 2005, both
the PAN and the PRD stated that they supported electoral reform for those living abroad,
especially when it came close to election time (Bada, 2003). Eventually, both the PRD
and PAN voted heavily in favor of a legislation that made sure that Mexicans living
abroad would not have the opportunity to change the Mexican political landscape. The
PRI emphasizes a different political strategy than the PRD and the PAN. The PRI has the
ability to go on the offensive by sending resources to the states that have done poorly in
the past, while the PRD and the PAN are very much focused on defending their territory
by spending resources in areas where they have done well in past elections (Harbers,
2012). This might explain why the two parties who historically have been in the minority
might favor a legislation that has little or no impact on election results. It is likely that the
PRD and PAN were afraid that the PRI, with its superior resources and organization,
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might make inroads with those living abroad in the future. Therefore, the PRI could
further its dominance on Mexican politics.
The left leaning PRD was in many ways most supportive of external voting
reforms being passed. It was Cuahtémoc Cárdenas who went to the United States in 1988
pledging support for Mexicans living abroad after the issue of migrants being allowed to
vote had not been in the public discourse for quite some time (Waldinger, 2008). After
Cárdenas lost, the PRD redoubled its efforts to expand migrant rights. It became the only
party that actively campaigned and drew large numbers of Mexican emigrants to its
events (Smith, 2008). In 2003, the PRD Governor of Michoacán, Lázaro Cárdenas Batel,
sent a bill to the state legislature which would have allowed migrants to vote in state
elections as well as to run for public offices. However, the bill was rejected by the PRI
and PAN delegations in the state legislature (Marcelli and Cornelius, 2005). The PRD
put in place commissions for promoting the vote abroad and it established thirty PRD
committees in thirty U.S states (Bada, 2003, 24). It is perplexing to understand why the
PRD would not advocate for legislation that would make it easy for migrants abroad to
vote since it is quite possible that the PRD would be able to establish a large number of
new voters abroad with some campaigning (Lawson, 2003).
Members of the PAN had been actively claiming that they are in favor of migrants
abroad having the opportunity to vote. However, once the PAN was in power, there was
not much action to get external voting legislations passed (Bada, 2003). The PAN’s
leadership was even hesitant to back its own President’s legislative proposal to pass
voting reforms for migrants (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). External voting had been a
key issue in the 2000 presidential elections. Some within the Fox campaign saw his
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position on external voting as an important aspect to why he won; Vicente Fox had
supported migrant voting rights in contradiction to the PRI’s candidate Francisco
Labastida who opposed external voting (Smith, 2003). The PAN had lobbied those living
abroad to support the PAN by installing promotion offices in several major American
cities and by giving out three minutes phone cards to Mexican immigrants, asking them
to call their friends and families to vote for the PAN candidates (Bada, 2003, 24). After
being elected, Fox reiterated his support for allowing Mexicans abroad to vote, and Fox
was able to partially fulfill his promise to the migrant community in 2005 when the
electoral reforms were passed (Smith, 2003).
On June 28, 2005, Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies passed a long-awaited
legislation on external voting. That legislation, however, resembled more a last-minute
political compromise than a thorough measure to enfranchise the millions of citizens
abroad. In the last full year of his presidential term, Fox came up with a bill that would
not threaten any party, as the institutional factors included in the bill would surely limit
voter turnout, since voting abroad was made difficult and costly. But at the same time,
Fox was able to keep his promise of adopting external voting. In the end, the parties
involved did not fear the migrant community living in the United States, as the parties
took a rational choice of passing legislation that would not create uncertainty because the
legislation was marred with institutional hurdles for any potential eligible Mexican voter
living abroad. It seems likely that the PRI got the difficult institutional factors into the
bill, which mitigated any potential political consequences coming from an anti-PRI
sentiment from the voters abroad. Meanwhile, it looks like the PRD and PAN made sure
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that no party could campaign abroad, preventing the PRI to make serious inroads with the
emigrant community.

Table 4.1 Voting of Mexican Representatives
Voted For
Voted Against
Did not
vote/absent/other
PRI
194
5
20
PAN
144
0
4
PRD
91
1
3
Source: http://www.diputados.gob.mx/Votaciones.htm16
Party

After a debate lasting for over a decade, the final vote that allowed external voting
was passed almost unanimously. The PRI, PRD, and PAN came together to support a bill
which allowed them to say they had finally passed reforms, but at the same time they did
not have to worry about any extensive political changes such as a new political
movement that would focus on representing Mexicans living abroad. Additionally, none
of the others parties that had representatives in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies voted
against the legislation.17 The legislation to allow Mexicans living abroad to vote was
popular in Mexico, as many saw it as another step for a more democratic Mexico, and no
party wished to be on the wrong side of the issue before the 2006 elections (Smith, 2008).
The eventual legislation that was passed was a big disappointment to migrant
leaders in the United States. The new law prohibited candidates and parties from
campaigning abroad, which is something that all the three major parties had done in the
past. It became illegal to support the parties financially, therefore, greatly minimizing the
impact Mexicans could have on the domestic political process. Also, it mandated postal
16

In order to find this information, one must go to http://www.diputados.gob.mx/Votaciones.htm. Then
click on the Primer periodo extraordinario Junio 2005 which is located under the information of the LIX
Legislatura (2003-2006). Then click on votación for bill number1785-III, martes 28 de junio de 2005.
Information accessed March 5, 2014.
17
The Parties that are not included on the table include: Partido Verde Ecologista de México (14 voted yes,
3 were absent), Partido del Trabajo (6 voted yes), Movimiento Ciudadano (5 voted yes), Independents (1
voted yes, 1 was absent)
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voting instead of letting migrants vote at Mexican embassies and consulates throughout
the world, and it limited participation to only those that already had electoral credentials,
which are only available in Mexico. Finally, a potential voter had to send a written
request to be added to the list of those who were eligible to vote abroad (Waldinger,
2008). Any potential voter has to be on the Mexican National Voter Registry and has to
have a valid electoral credential with a photo which can only be issued by the Mexican
government (Smith, 2008). It is much more difficult for those who are undocumented to
cross the border to Mexico as they face the prospect of being apprehended by the
authorities in the United States when they come back. Furthermore, undocumented
migrants often get rid of their identification cards, in case they are apprehended by the
local authorities in the United States (Waldinger, 2008). Therefore, those who did want to
vote had to jump through several institutional hurdles that made voting expensive both in
terms of time spent and money.
IFE is now in charge of monitoring that the parties do not campaign abroad. This
has angered many migrant leaders, who see political campaigning by the political parties
as the most effective measure to the get the migrant community to vote. There is also a
great uncertainty about what campaigning actually means. Some have questioned
whether wearing a t-shirt that states PRI on it while explaining the rules of the 2005
electoral reforms is breaking the law (Smith, 2008, 727). That is why many feel that
Mexicans living abroad did not gain power with the 2005 external voting law. “Mexican
politics abroad has moved from a system of‘campaigns without votes’ to ‘votes without
campaigns’” (Lafleur, 2011, 488).
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IFE was also just given three months to implement all the rules before the
deadline for registering to vote expired. After the Mexican government had spent over 25
million dollars (Fierro and Carillo, 2007, 192),18 only a little over thirty-three thousands
Mexicans living abroad voted. This was significantly lower than what any previous
scholarly research or government report had predicted (Enrico and Comelius, 2005;
Smith, 2008). The Mexican authorities were satisfied with the results due to the reliability
of the external electoral process and they stated that the low turnout was due to a lack of
interest by those living abroad in the politics of Mexico more than any other factors
(Lafleur and Chelius, 2011). Although the government suspected that the short time IFE
had to implement the elections played a role as well, furthermore, around a quarter of the
applications that IFE received were denied due to technical reasons (Lafleur and Chelius,
2011).
Beyond the institutional factor, one other explanation is that Mexican migrants are
not interested in the Mexican political process, although some scholarship has questioned
this assumption (Suro and Escobar, 2006). Although Mexicans in the United States
account for well over ninety percent of migrants living abroad, their percent of votes cast
was only about eighty-five percent. Countries that have smaller numbers of Mexican
migrants such, as France and Switzerland, had much higher turnout rates (Lafleur and
Chelius, 2011).
The PRI’s fear that the traditional oppositions parties (the PRD and PAN) would
gain significantly if voting from abroad was to be adopted turned out to be substantiated.
The PAN received over fifty-eight percent of the votes coming from abroad.19 But since

18
19

The Mexican government spent an estimated overall cost of 305 million Mexican Pesos
Source: http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/proceso_2005-2006/cuadernos/pdf/C4_vmre.pdf
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there are so few that voted, it cannot be generalized that these percentages were to hold
true if the number of voters would be drastically increased. It is likely that the PAN was
highly overrepresented in the 2000 and 2006 elections. However, the support of the three
major parties does support the hypothesis of most scholars that the PRI would not gain
much support of Mexican migrants.
In the 2012 elections, the PRI received less than fourteen percent of the votes
abroad
Chappell Lawson (2003) has come up with several hypotheses why the PRI does so much
poorer abroad, including that the PRI tends to get a very favorable media coverage in
Mexico, while the media in the United States tends to be more critical of the PRI.
Furthermore, young men tend to be the most loyal supporters of the PAN, and there is an
overrepresentation of young men who migrate compared to other demographic groups.
Between the elections of 2006 to 2012, voter turnout increased by only seven thousand
people.20

Table 4.2 – Results of 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections
Percentage of total Percentage of votes
Difference
votes
outside of Mexico
PAN
26.05%
42.17%
+16.12%
PRI
39.19%
13.81%
-25.38%
PRD
32.42%
29.76%
-2.66%

Party

Conclusion
As noted, political parties in Mexico publicly stated that they were in favor letting
migrants abroad vote. It seems clear that in the case of Mexico all the political parties
came together to adopt reforms, so they could say that they had done something, but at
20

http://www.votoextranjero.mx/web/guest/resultados Accessed May 12th 2013.
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the same time it look s like they had no intention to change the political landscape.
“Mexican domestic actors achieved their objective of preventing emigrants from playing
a crucial role in the 2006 presidential election, which later proved to be highly disputed”
(Lafleur, 2011, 489). The future of political participation of Mexican emigrants is
gloomy. Since the political parties are not allowed to campaign in the United States, it
will have to be the hometown associations that do most of the work to get emigrants to
vote. Almost 90 percent of all emigrants from Mexico are bound for the United States,
and around 80 percent of all Mexican migrants living in the United States live in U.S
states that used to be part of Mexico (Durand, 2007, 224). If Mexico allowed those
abroad to vote at their consulates around the world, the voter turnout would surely
increase significantly. However, that is unlikely to occur unless there is a real demand
coming from Mexicans living abroad. It seems that the PRI fears that the PAN and PRD
would receive the lion’s share of the votes coming from abroad, while the PRD and PAN
fear that the PRI could make inroads with the Mexican community abroad.
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Chapter 5:
Institutional Constraint and External Voting: The Case of Chile
The debate on whether to adopt external voting in Chile has been taking place for
well over a decade, with numerous proposals having been brought up in the Chilean
legislature. However, so far, no external voting bill has been passed despite several
Chilean presidents endorsing external voting and evidence showing that a large majority
of Chileans would be in favor of letting those abroad have the opportunity to vote
(Escobar, 2007). The politics of external voting in Chile is still highly influenced by the
rule of Augusto Pinochet, although it has been almost a quarter of a century since he
exited from the presidency. The Pinochet regime used killings and forced exile as
strategies to get rid of its political opponents. The brutality of Pinochet created tens of
thousands of political refugees that never returned to Chile. After Pinochet left the
presidency, he remained an influential figure in Chile that still had many supporters and
admirers (Landau and Anderson, 1998). Pinochet’s power made it difficult for ensuing
elected presidents of Chile to change his legacy. Those who wanted justice for the
heinous crimes committed during the Pinochet era had to compete with the will of the
military that adamantly opposed any investigations into what had occurred during their
rule (Londregan, 2000). In order to understand why external voting has not been adopted
in Chile, it is necessary to understand the reign of General Pinochet and the electoral
rules he put in place before leaving his office. The 1989 Constitution that was adopted
shortly before Pinochet left the presidency kept electoral rules which highly favored
conservative political factions in Chile. These rules have made it very difficult for
external voting legislation to be adopted despite there being political will to do so.
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The Reign of Pinochet and Return to Democracy
From 1932 to the coup in 1973, Chile was seen as one of the most consolidated
democracies in Latin America. It resembled a European party system with clear
cleavages within society (Drake and Javsic, 1995). However, the events of September
11th, 1973 significantly changed the course of history in Chile, when the Chilean
military, under the leadership of General Pinochet, bombed the presidential palace and
conducted a coup d’état. The coup overthrew President Salvador Allande, who had been
the first in the world to be democratically elected a socialist president in Latin America
(Adams, 2013). The repression that ensued the military overthrow was immense. It has
been estimated that up to 30,000 people were murdered by the Pinochet regime and up to
80,000 political prisoners were taken (Angell and Carstairs, 1987). The armed forces
went on a mission to get rid of its political enemies regardless of whether they showed
resistance or not (Ensalaco, 2000). The Pinochet regime also punished its enemies by
forcing them into exile and denying them employment and income.
Many Chileans who had leftist ties both in the public and private sector were put
on a government blacklist that denied them employment (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007).
Military officers replaced university professors who had an association with the left, and
leftist students were expelled (Oppenheim, 1999). The Pinochet government also
punished its political enemies by sending them to isolated parts of Chile, where they had
to sign in with the local authorities daily (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). However, perhaps
most important for the purpose of external voting, the political and economic persecution
of the Pinochet regime led between 200,000 to 400,000 Chileans to leave their country
(Stern, 2010, 36).
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Pinochet was not the first leader in Chilean history to use exile in order to get rid
of political opposition (Angell and Carstairs, 1987). However, nothing in Chile’s history
compared to the mass exile that occurred under the Pinochet regime (Wright and Zúñiga,
2007). Many Chileans realized early what was about to occur and they managed to
escape by taking refuge in foreign embassies and with the help of humanitarian agencies
(Adams, 2013). Some foreign governments that were sympathetic to those being
persecuted quickly filled their embassies with and allowed people to sleep on their
embassy grounds. Some other dissidents thought that the regime would be short-lived
and escaped to neighboring countries, expecting to return home soon (Wright and Zúñiga,
2007). However, the Pinochet regime was remarkably durable, surviving a wave of
democratization in South America (Remmer, 1989). It has been estimated that at least
two percent of Chile’s population in 1973 ended up seeking refuge in foreign countries
(Hirsch, 2012).
It was in the early 1980s that real problems started arising for the Pinochet
regime. The country had been hit hard by an economic slowdown, which emboldened
political parties that had been outlawed to start to organize themselves (Silva, 1991).
Protest further splintered the Pinochet regime and the leaders of several important
security forces stated that they would welcome civilian rule instead of Pinochet’s rule
(Angell and Pollack, 1990). Nonetheless, Pinochet was able to hold onto power until he
called for a plebiscite in 1988. Pinochet and the military had expected that the 1988
plebiscite would consolidate their power by giving Pinochet eight more years to govern
(Garretón, 1995). Registration started in 1986, with Pinochet himself the first person to
register. The regime made registration easy for its political allies, but made it
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complicated for perceived opponents to sign up. Furthermore, no parties were allowed to
get any funding from foreign countries (Oppenheim, 1999). Despite Pinochet having
systematic advantages, the center-left parties unified, and they were able to defeat
Pinochet, as 55 percent voted against him remaining in power.
After losing the plebiscite, Pinochet focused his efforts on retaining power. Laws
were adopted that kept Pinochet in charge of the armed forces and made the military a
very autonomous institution apart from civilian control (Angell and Pollack, 1990).
Furthermore, Pinochet named himself a senator-for life. However, most importantly,
Pinochet was able to change the electoral rules before leaving the presidency.
The battle for suffrage of Chilean emigrants has been largely impacted by the
electoral rules that were implemented during the Pinochet regime. Before Pinochet left
power, he was able to largely write the rules by which future democratically elected
governments would have to abide by (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997). The Pinochet
regime had initially favored a first-past-the-post in order to create a two party system, but
once the regime realized that they would probably not win a majority of the seats, they
decided to come up with a system that would favor them in the legislature (Angell and
Pollack, 1990). Chile uses the d’Hondt allocation rule which almost assures that
conservative faction get one representative in most districts (Haggard and Kaufman,
1997). Under the d’Hondt system, there are two representatives from each district, but in
order for one party to gain both seats, it must get twice as many votes than the second
biggest party. Otherwise, one seat is allocated to the party that receives the most votes
and one seat goes to the party that comes in second (Rahat and Sznajder, 1998). The
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d’Hondt electoral rules have helped to ensure overrepresentation of conservative parties
who block external voting laws.
Political Actors Involved
The democratization of Chile after Pinochet has produced one of the most stable
multiparty democracies in Latin America (Alemán and Saiegh, 2007). The election of
Sebastián Piñera as president in 2010 helped illustrate the consolidation of democracy in
Chile, as Piñera was the first center-right president since Chile democratized after the
reign of Pinochet (Luna and Mardones, 2010). Piñera succeeded the left leaning
Michelle Bachelet, who had been able to do away with some of the institutional rules that
had been put in place during the Pinochet era such as guaranteed seats in the senate.
However, Bachelet and her coalition had not been able to get rid of the main element of
the binomial electoral system (Luna and Mardones, 2010). Chile has been admired for its
stability since it democratized, but its main political actors are still constrained in their
actions due to the rules set by the Pinochet regime.
The policies of the Chilean state towards its emigrant population have drastically
changed since Pinochet left power. The Pinochet regime had portrayed those abroad as
being hostile to the Chilean state, or even as being foreign agents (Wright and Zúñiga,
2007). Starting with the rule of President Aylwin, who was the first to be elected after
Pinochet, government policies and institutions were set up to help with Chile’s past.
However, since Pinochet still played a vital role within the Chilean state it was limited
what the state apparatus could do (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Policies were set up to
help Chileans emigrants return, but the success of these policies were limited, and many
Chileans who did return back home no longer felt that they belonged there (Stern, 2010).
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By expelling the leftist political elite, Pinochet managed to keep them out of domestic
politics, but it also meant that there was a large group of politically active Chileans
around the world working on delegitimizing his rule. Since democratization, it has been
the conservative political factions which have been the main opposition group to external
voting. They are afraid of including a new bloc of voters who might influence the
balance of power in Chilean politics.
Role of the Chilean State
A key strategy of the Pinochet regime to consolidate its power was to murder,
incarcerate, or force its enemies to move abroad (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). In the first
few months of military rule, the intelligence and secret police agency (DINA) was
created. The DINA ruthlessly went after political enemies in Chile and abroad (Adams,
2013). In 1974, the DINA started tracking and killing political leaders that were in exile.
This included car bombings in Argentina, Italy, and the United States (Stern, 2010). The
DINA sent a clear message to Chilean leftists that they were not safe even while abroad.
The Pinochet regime also had a stringent requirement for who could return to Chile up
until the plebiscite in 1988. Once Pinochet was voted out of power, the new democratic
government did make efforts to welcome those back that had been exiled and persecuted
during the time of Pinochet.
As power shifted away from Pinochet to a democratically elected government in
1990, there were great limits to what the new government could do. When President
Raúl Alfonsín had replaced the Bignone dictatorship in Argentina, he had sought
retribution for the crimes that had been committed. However, President Aylwin had few
other options than to deal with the crimes that were committed during the Pinochet
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regime symbolically, by holding public rituals remembering those who had been violated
(Robben, 2014). Aylwin did establish a truth commission to investigate the crimes that
had been committed during the Pinochet regime, but the effectiveness of this commission
was limited because of a 1978 law that had amnestied all of the regimes’ previous crimes
and because of the constitution that had been adopted under Pinochet (Wright and
Zúñiga, 2007; Robben, 2014).
Once the democratically elected government took control, the policies towards
those living abroad did change. No longer were Chileans forced to stay abroad because
of political reasons (Bolzman, 2011). President Aylwin did create the National Office of
Return (Oficina Nacional de Retorno) in the ministry of justice, whose purpose it was to
help those who returned from abroad to find employment and adjust to life in Chile
(Loveman, 1995). However, the agency never got the funding that it needed and only
lasted for three years (Stern, 2010), and most of those who had left during the Pinochet
Regime ended up staying in their adopted country (Bolzman, 2011).
Michelle Bachelet, who was elected as president of Chile in 2006 and again in
2014, has been a key supporter of letting Chileans abroad having the right to vote.
Bachelet is a poster child of the horrors that occurred during the Pinochet regime.
Following the coup, she was put in jail and tortured, as were her parents. Her father died
in prison; then, she went into exile with her mother. While in exile, she worked on
influencing foreign governments to oppose the Pinochet regime (Lieberfeld, 2011). Her
boyfriend and her mentor were killed by the Chilean secret police. Subsequently, she
married a Chilean exile and ended up returning to Chile, where she had been blacklisted
by the Pinochet (Lieberfeld, 2011). Therefore, from her life story, it should not come as a
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big surprise that she has been more determined than her predecessors to build
relationships with those that were violated during the military rule (Collins, 2009).
In 2006, Bachelet put together a commission to reform the electoral system, but
this proposal was quickly defeated and it never made it to the floor for a vote (Luna and
Mardones, 2010). In 2009, President Bachelet proposed legislation to the Senate that
would grant those living abroad the right to vote in presidential elections. Her opponents
in the Senate took the legislation to the Chilean Supreme Court to see if the constitution
adopted in the time of Pinochet would allow for it (Bolzman, 2011). Starting her second
term in 2014, Bachelet has vowed that her government will make the passing of external
voting a matter of urgency (Latercera, 2014).
Since the democratization in Chile, the state has implemented numerous policies
that are favorable for the migrant community, such as creating the National Office of
Return and allowing Chileans to receive dual citizenship. Additionally, every President
since Chile’s democratization in 1990 has favored external voting, including the centerright Sebastián Piñera (Escobar, 2007; Santiago Times, 2013a). Chile has also ratified
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, which encourages states to allow migrant workers to have
the right to vote from abroad (Marshall, 2011, 144-145). But, the electoral rules and the
Chilean constitution have made it difficult for any government to adopt and implement
external voting.
Role of Chilean Migrants
The 1973 coup created a Chilean “diaspora” that dispersed around the world.
Leaving Chile became a matter of life or death for thousands of Chileans who could
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expect to be severely punished or killed if they got caught by the armed forces. Chileans
went all throughout the world. It has been estimated that exiles went from 110 to 140
different countries on all continents (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007, 36). However, most
common destinations for Chileans were the neighboring countries and, Venezuela,
Mexico, and Cuba who openly welcomed a large number of political exiles (Wright and
Zúñiga, 2007). The Pinochet regime still saw those that were exiled as important
enemies, and the Chilean secret police tracked and killed some prominent leaders while
they were abroad (Stern, 2010).
Despite the brutality of the Pinochet regime, it did receive complicit support from
the Nixon administration for the coup (Calandra, 2013). However, the United States
government was enraged when the Chilean secret police killed Orlando Letelier and
Ronni Moffit, who were murdered close to the White House; Letelier had been a
diplomat in the Allande regime (Stern, 2010). Although forced exile ridded Pinochet of
many of his most prominent political opponents, it also turned out to be a problem as his
opponents were able to spread their anti-Pinochet message to governments throughout the
world (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007).
Using exile, Pinochet was able to get the leftist political elite out of the country,
which moved opposition out of the realm of domestic politics and out of Chile’s
boundaries (Portales, 1995). Nevertheless, Chileans abroad became a problem to the
Pinochet regime as once they arrived in their host countries they started organizing
against the Pinochet regime and started working around the world to delegitimize his
regime (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Although Chileans exiles were spread out throughout
the world, they had enough numbers to form communities in many cities around the
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world where they could organize against the Pinochet regime (Angell and Carstairs,
1987). Chileans abroad organized themselves in terms of the political parties they
belonged to (Zarzosa, 1998), unlike migrant organizations of most countries that tend to
organize themselves around their home town or region. Chileans abroad were able to
gain some success in influencing foreign governments to pressure the Pinochet regime to
soften up its policies (Portales, 1995). They also worked to get the Pinochet government
condemned in international forums and campaigned governments to stop selling weapons
to Chile (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). The Chilean exile consisted of political elites,
businessmen, and academics that were able to build up strong relationships abroad.
Those who left Chile during the 1973 coup were not the average migrants, who
tend to have limited opportunities in their homeland and leave for jobs. These were
former government officials, academics, and businessman that had connections abroad,
and they were able to build relationships abroad. Although there was no clear leader in
exile, as had been with Juan Perón in Argentina, there were many figures that were had
the experiences to go into government positions once Chile democratized (Silva, 1991).
Chilean exiles played an important role in Chile’s democratization process. In
1984, key opposition leaders started challenging the no-return policy of the Pinochet
regime, by entering Chile without authorization from the regime. The Pinochet
government initially reacted badly to exiles challenging its policy and sent many of those
back, action which was harshly criticized by the international community (Wright and
Zúñiga, 2007). However, before the 1988 plebiscite, almost all exiles were invited to
return back to Chile (Drake and Javsic, 1995). The exiles were able to help defeat
Pinochet in the plebiscite and they helped bring about the Socialist-Christian Democrat
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coalition that has been a prevalent political group since Chile democratized (Wright and
Zúñiga, 2007, 47). However, many of those that did return to Chile found that the
country had greatly changed during the Pinochet regime and they no longer felt as they
belonged there.
Many returnees felt out of place once they returned back home to Chile.
Furthermore, many Chileans saw those returning back from exile as representing bad
memories that most Chileans were not necessarily willing to deal with (Stern, 2010).
Most who returned from exile got a cold reception, and many businesses were hesitant to
hire those that returned. This occurred in part because the Pinochet regime had been
successful in painting those that left as not being victims, but instead having received
Pinochet’s grace to leave (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007, 46). Most of those that had been
forced out ended up staying in their host country, but the National Office of Return did
assist over 50,000 people in their moves to come back (Stern, 2010). Since Chile
democratized, emigrants have focused their attention on getting justice for the crimes that
were committed during the Pinochet regime and increasing their rights as citizens.
Although the relationship between emigrants and the state has changed
completely since Chile democratized, there are many that feel that it is still not at a
sufficient level (Bolzman, 2011). Chileans abroad have in large part focused on the
human rights crime committed during the rule of the military (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007),
such as the Chilean migrant associations in Switzerland financing books on human rights
(Bolzman, 2011). Furthermore, after Pinochet was arrested in London, Chileans abroad
played an active role in sharing their views on the arrest in Chilean media (Tanner, 2001).
Chileans abroad have also requested to have the right to vote in Chilean elections while
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abroad. Migrant organizations have strongly advocated for this when Chilean national
leaders have made trips abroad (Bolzman, 2011). For the 2013 presidential elections,
Chileans abroad raised awareness of their requests by voting symbolically in pretend
elections (CNNChile, 2014). They have also built up relationships with Chilean
embassies, which they use as a gateway to lobby for their rights (Bolzman, 2011).
However, the efforts of Chilean emigrants have not yet yielded results, as conservative
political forces fear what the electoral consequences that external voting might bring
about.
Chilean Political Parties
Allowing Chileans abroad the right to vote has been an important topic in Chilean
politics for numerous years. It has been estimated that around 850,000 Chileans live
abroad, although some argue that this number underestimates the true number of migrants
(Toro and Walker, 2007, 134). Chilean presidents have unanimously favored external
voting since democratization (Escobar, 2007), and numerous legislations allowing
external voting have been brought up in the Chilean legislature. But so far, no legislation
has passed the legislative hurdle, in large part because the conservative faction fears that
it might benefit the left.
A major reason why external voting has not been adopted in Chile is because it is
perceived that those abroad would favor the center left Concertación political coalition or
other left leaning political factions (López and Figueroa, 2009). Therefore, the left in
Chile has tended to be supported of external voting (Marshall, 2011), while the right has
been more reluctant to endorse it. Legislation that has been introduced to allow for
external voting have tended to come mostly from members of the Concertación (López
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and Figueroa, 2009). However, there have been exceptions to this rule, especially when
candidates from the right are running for the presidency (Santiago Times, 2013a). Given
the history of emigration during the Pinochet regime, it is easy to understand the concerns
of the political factions that supported Pinochet, that those abroad would be unlikely to
support them.
The mass exodus that took place after the 1973 coup occurred because Pinochet
strategically went after those who had been associated with the left leaning parties
(Bolzman, 2011). The number of political elites that were forced to exile significantly
changed how the left leaning parties were able to function. Furthermore, the main
opposition political factions of the left were banned. Subsequently, it is logical for
certain political parties to calculate that those living abroad would be likely to vote
against their interest. Yet, there is some evidence which suggests that only a small
proportion of Chileans currently live abroad because of political reasons, according to the
Chilean census only 10 percent of Chileans abroad state political reasons for being the
main motivation as to why they do not leave in Chile (López and Figueroa, 2009, 59).
The institutional rules that were adopted during the Pinochet regime have prevented the
Concertación from being able to adopt external voting.
Under the d’Hondt system, a party must receive 66.7 percent of the votes in order
to guarantee that it will win both seats in a district. This system forces parties to form
electoral coalitions in order to be competitive to win seats (Huneeus, 2005). Although
the d’Hondt system has brought with it great stability, it has also disproportionally
rewarded the conservative leaning Alliance with representatives that have been able to
block external voting legislations. In 2006, President Bachelet of the Concertación set up
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a commission to reform the electoral system, but it was immediately blocked, as the
political right did not want to get away with this system that rewarded them for being the
second biggest political faction in Chile (Luna and Mardones, 2010). Political parties
have also debated how external voting should be implemented if it were to be adopted.
Another important concern for the political parties in Chile regards how external
voting would be implemented. Chile has used a peculiar electoral system in which
people are not forced to register to vote, but in which voting is compulsory (Huneeus,
2005). Subsequently, it must be decided how those abroad would register to vote and
what would be needed in order for those abroad to register to vote. Furthermore, it is
unclear in which district those living abroad would be counted in. There has been some
discussion that votes from abroad would be counted in a major metropolitan area, similar
to what Peru does, where the votes from abroad are included in the same constituency as
the voters in Lima (Toro and Walker, 2007). There is also not a consensus on what
voting method would be used, whether it would take place at Chilean diplomatic missions
around the world or whether voters would mail in their votes (López and Figueroa, 2009).
It seems that there is a consensus from the various proposed legislations that voters from
abroad should be allowed in presidential elections and referendums (Navarro, Morales
and Gratschew, 2007; Santiago Times, 2013b).
Conclusion
Since Chile democratized, it has been one of the most stable democracies in Latin
America, consisting of two dominant political factions. However, this stability has been
brought about by electoral rules adopted during the Pinochet era which has largely
prevented those that committed crimes during the coup to be punished, and it has also
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made it very difficult to adopt external voting legislations. The 1973 coup created a large
group of politically active Chileans abroad. The mass exile removed Pinochet’s
opponents from being able to participate in Chilean politics, but at the same time, it gave
his adversaries the opportunity to work on delegitimizing his rule throughout the world
(Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Pinochet was able to create the rules of Chilean politics
before leaving office, and governments that followed his rule have found it very difficult
to make changes to these rules (López and Figueroa, 2009). It has been my argument that
these rules have greatly limited the opportunity to adopt external voting although there
has been the political will to do so. Furthermore, the conservative political faction in
Chile has also generally been opposed to it as it expects that those abroad will favor its
political opponents.
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Chapter 6:
Adopting External Voting
This chapter examines the findings from the Cox Proportional Hazard Model and
offers an analysis on the results. Two separate regressions were performed. The first
regression (table 6.1) measures some of the main variables that have been mentioned in
previous scholarship on the subject, and the second regression (table 6.4) includes
electoral system variables that are intended to look at institutional factors. Additionally,
this chapter compares and reviews the findings of the Mexican and Chilean case studies.
The next section will review the results from the first regression.
Regression I
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Table 6.1 – Regression 1
Coefficient

Variable

Standard error

Remittance/ GDP

136.5736**

64.86359

Remittance GDP/ squared

-1208.04**

602.123

Freedomhouse score
Left leaning executive
Share of the executive
Diffusion
Log GDP
Political globalization
N-Size 210
Chi Square 17.05

-.7784559
2.632665***
-4.547507
-.8204858
-.8278903
.1032548

.9753588
.9817958
3.098586
2.246075
.8127563
.0708308

**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 * p < 0.10

As was discussed in chapter 3 (Theory and Methods) the relationship between
external voting and remittances has been greatly discussed in the scholarly literature.
However, the statistical relationship between the two has remained questionable. The
most interesting result from the first regression is the role remittances have on the
likelihood a country will adopt external voting. The coefficient for remittances as a
percent of GDP is positive and significant when it is not squared, and when remittances
as a percent of GDP are squared the coefficient becomes negative and still remains
significant at the five percent level. This suggests that remittance to GDP has a positive
effect on the likelihood on the adoption of external voting, up to a certain “tipping point”.
Once the effect has been accounted for, the effect diminishes, as suggested by the
negative and significant coefficient for remittance GDP squared. It is important to
consider that governments and politicians must calculate their options of either keeping
their emigrant population happy who are sending remittances by allowing them to vote,
against the political uncertainty that might occur whenever a new group is given the right
to vote (Tager, 2006). At high levels, remittances might be a political liability for those
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who are considering adopting external voting. These results shown in table 6.1 indicate
that political parties and politicians want to restrict the power of those abroad, which
certainly could back up those who see the main goal of politicians to stay in power and be
risk aversive (Downs, 1957; Geddes, 1991; Mayhew, 2004). The case study of Mexico
appears to support this finding. The number of Mexican emigrants and the money they
send back certainly has the possibility of making them a noteworthy political force in
Mexican politics. The Mexican political parties were fearful of the political impact those
living abroad; therefore, they ended up adopting a law that makes it difficult and
expensive for those abroad to vote despite the contribution they make to the Mexican
economy.
Remittances also limit the power of politicians to hand out patronage. As Tobias
Pfutze (2007) has stated “remittances are completely outside the government’s control
they shift political power away from it towards the population, rendering clientilistic
arrangements between the government and the electorate less sustainable” (2007, 2).
Since politicians often use redistribution as a means to achieve their electoral goals (Cox
and McCubbins, 1986), it is plausible that they see increased power of those outside as a
threat to their own electoral viability.
The only other variable that is statistically significant at the five percent level is
the binary variable for whether a country has a leftist government or not. One
explanation for why leftist governments are more likely to adopt external voting in Latin
America and the Caribbean is that leftist governments are more likely to want a build a
symbolic relationship with those abroad. Leftist governments in the region also have the
history of being more willing to enfranchise new groups (Smith, 2005). Furthermore, left
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leaning government might also think that they are likely to gain an electoral advantage by
allowing those abroad to vote.
Net migration was also tested by using data available from the United Nations.21
There was a statistically significant relationship between the coefficient for negative
migration rate per 1,000 habitants (people emigrating) and adoption of external voting.
However, the migration variable was too collinear with remittances as a percent of GDP,
and therefore it was dropped.
Interestingly, countries that have a lower Freedomhouse score (lower scores
meaning more democratic) are not more likely to adopt external voting. In fact, countries
that have not adopted external voting tend to have slightly lower Freedomhouse mean
scores (2.66) than those that have adopted it (2.83). These findings contradicts the results
of Blais, Massicotte and Yoshinaka who found that there was a norm among “strong
democracies” to allow citizens abroad have the right to vote (2001, 57). However, since
the Freedomhouse variable is not significant no generalizations can be made about the
relationship between democracy and the adoption of external voting.
Countries that have a higher log GDP are not more likely to adopt external voting.
Subsequently, it does not appear that countries base their decision on whether to adopt
external voting based on their financial capabilities of implementing the law.
Neighborhood diffusion is also not significant, and neither is political globalization nor
the share of the executive parties’ percentage of seats in the lower house.
The second regression is meant to measure institutional election rules. Due to
multiple collinearity problems and since the electoral system variable would predict some
of the party effects, this model was done separately. The dummy variable for single21

Dataset is available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/migration.htm
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member district plurality voting (SMDP) was used as the reference variable; therefore,
the coefficients for the other electoral systems are measured in relation to SMPD.

Regression II
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Table 6.2 – Regression II
Coefficient

Variable

]

Standard error

Proportional representation

.6535801

1.591549

Modified proportional
representation
D’hondt
Remittance/ GDP
Remittance GDP /squared

.8989175

1.51293

-32.09856****
100.9307*
-812.9531**

3.330643
54.72792
417.2212

-.6287525
.3262299*
-.0093826

.5213937
.1735521
.0619138

Freedomhouse score
Log GDP
Political globalization
N-size 314
Chi square 1094.78

**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 * p < .10

As can be seen from table 6.2, the coefficient for binomial d’hondt system is
statistically significant and negatively correlated with the adoption of external voting.
The d’hondt system tends to exaggerate the electoral gains of the second largest political
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parties. As was documented in chapter 5 (Institutional Constraint and External Voting:
The Case of Chile) the d’hondt system has overrepresented rural interest in Chile which
favored the conservatives parties that have been opposed to external voting. The
coefficients for remittances as a percent to GDP and remittances squared as percentage to
GDP remain consistent. After accounting for the effect of remittance at the tipping point,
at high levels the likelihood that a country will adopt external voting diminishes. In this
trial wealthier countries are more likely to adopt external voting, as the coefficient for log
GDP variable is significant at the ten percent level. The next section will compare the
results from the case studies.
Case Studies
External voting has been a salient political issue for numerous years with several
legislations having been brought up to adopt external voting in both Chile and Mexico.
After strong pressure from Mexico’s migrant community, Mexico’s three main political
parties were able to come up with a compromise in 2005. Chile has not yet adopted
external voting although every president since Chile democratized in 1990 has endorsed
adopting it. The two case studies focused on the main political actors involved in
deciding whether external voting is adopted: the state, migrants, and the political parties.
In Chile, when General Augusto Pinochet was in power, the Chilean state was
outright hostile to its migrants, sometimes referring to those abroad as traitors. Once
Pinochet exited the presidency attempts were made by the Chilean state to right the
wrongs of the past, but these efforts were minimal in large part because Pinochet still
played a significant role in the politics of Chile. In Mexico, the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional was continually in power for over 70 years until the year 2000. During much
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of this time the Mexican state pursued a policy of limited engagement with its migrant
community showing little interest in adopting external voting. However, the Mexican
state became more willing to implement favorable policies towards its emigrant
population in the 1990s when the Mexican state saw its interest being threatened by antiimmigration sentiment in the United States, and also because they wanted to use their
migrant community to lobby for their interests.
After democratizing, both countries have moved from being opposed to external
voting to at least mildly supporting it. Both governments have set up programs to work
with their emigrant population, and allowed their emigrants have the opportunity to
acquire dual citizenship. Mexico and Chile struggled with the legitimate concerns of the
logistical problems that are involved with enfranchising citizens abroad and how electoral
integrity can be safeguarded.
When the military coup occurred in 1973 there was a mass exodus of Chilean
leftist that spread throughout the world. A unique characteristic of the Chilean emigrant
community was its education level and socio-economic status. Many of those that were
forced out were political elites, academics, and businessmen. Chileans organizations
abroad have often spoken with a unified voice as they regularly organized themselves in
terms of political parties (Zarzosa, 1998), but unlike Mexico the Chilean economy does
not rely heavily on those living abroad. This has led Chilean emigrants to lobby for the
right to vote from abroad based on normative arguments; instead of their contribution as
was the case in Mexico. Mexico has a very large migrant population with a vast majority
of them living in the United States. Mexican emigrants play an important role in the
Mexican economy through the remittances they send back. Mexican hometown
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associations have actively lobbied for the expansion of rights of those living abroad, and
they have achieved notable success as Mexico has created numerous programs to work
with its migrant population.
Since Chile democratized after the rule of Pinochet every president of Chile has
endorsed external voting. However, the conservative parties in Chile fear what the
political consequences of external voting might be and they have been able to block
attempts to adopt external voting. The conservatives fear that the center left
Concertación political coalition or other left leaning parties would make electoral gains
(López and Figueroa, 2009).
In Mexico the three main Mexican political parties tended to portray themselves
as being in favor of letting those abroad have the opportunity to vote. However, all the
major parties feared what might occur if a large new group would be enfranchised, which
led them to coming up with a compromise, that was almost passed unanimously, that
limited the political power of those living abroad.
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Table 6.3 – Review of Case Studies
Chile
State

Emigrants

Political Parties

Outcome

Went from being openly hostile
to its emigrant community to mild
support of external voting.
The emigrant community is
spread throughout numerous
countries. Tend to be politically
motivated.
Political parties of the left have
endorsed external voting, but so
far no compromise has been
reached.
Chile has not adopted external
voting, in large part due to their
d’hondt electoral system.

Mexico

Went from opposing external
voting to mild support of external
voting.
Large in numbers, highly
concentrated in the United States.
However, their cohesiveness is
questionable.
After push from the PAN and the
PRD, the PRI was willing to
compromise after it no longer
controlled the presidency.
Mexico adopted external voting
in 2005, although the legislation
has been criticized for severely
limiting the political influence of
those abroad.

As shown below in table 6.4, out of the eight proposed hypotheses in chapter 3
(Theory and Methods) 1, 2 and 4 are supported by the regression and 1, 2 and 6 are
supported by the case studies. The Mexican emigrant community does have a much
larger impact on the Mexican economy than the impact of remittances sent by Chileans
abroad. Before external voting was adopted, Mexican emigrants often made the claim
that they should be allowed to vote from abroad because of their financial contributions.
However, due to the potential power of Mexicans abroad Mexican political parties
decided to limit their impact.
Mexico’s economy is also significantly larger than Chile’s which would suggest
that Mexico would be more capable of implementing external voting, especially since
such a large percentage of Mexicans emigrants live in the United States. Mexico ended
up spending over 25 million dollars on setting up voting from abroad (Fierro and Carillo,
2007, 192).
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Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: Countries with a
higher percentage of remittances
measured as a percentage of GDP
are more likely to adopt external
voting
Hypothesis 2: The
impact of remittances as percent
of GDP is nonlinear, after
accounting for topping the effects
dissipates

Hypothesis 3: Countries with a
lower combined Freedomhouse
political and civil rights score are
more likely to have adopted
external voting.

Hypothesis 4: Countries with a
left leaning executive are more
likely to adopt external voting
Hypothesis 5: Countries that have
equilibrium of seat share in the
lower house of the party of the
executive are more likely to adopt
external voting.
Hypothesis 6: Countries are more
likely to adopt external voting if
they border a high percentage of
countries that have adopted
external voting.
Hypothesis 7: Countries with a
high gross domestic product are
more likely to adopt external
voting.
Hypothesis 8: Countries with a
high level of political
globalization are more likely to
adopt external voting.

Table 6.4 – Review of Hypothesis
Chile

Mexico

The average percentage of
remittances as a percentage of
GDP in Chile between 1980 to
2012 was 0.006 percent
Since remittances are not a
significant percentage of the
Chilean economy, Chilean
politicians have not opposed
external voting legislation on the
grounds that Chilean emigrants
will be too influential

The average percentage of
remittances in Mexico as a
percentage of GDP between 1980
to 2012 was 1.54 percent
The potential power that Mexican
emigrants could have on the
political process was a key reason
for why institutional
arrangements were put in place to
limit their influences

The average combined
Freedomhouse score in Chile
between 1980 to 2012 was 2.60

The average combined
Freedomhouse score in Mexico
between 1980 to 2012 was 3.21

From 1990, when Chile
democratized, to 2012, four out
of five presidents of Chile have
been left leaning.
From 1980 to 2010 the average
seat share of the executive party
in the lower house was 31.36
percent22

External voting was adopted
when the center-right Partido
Acción Nacional controlled the
presidency
From 1980 to 2010 the average
seat share of the executive party
in the lower house was 53.92

Between 1980 to 2012 all of
Chile’s neighbors had adopted
external voting

Between 1980 to 2012, two of
three Mexico’s neighbors had
adopted external voting

The mean GDP of Chile between
1980 to 2012 was 87.1 billion
dollars23

The mean GDP of Mexico
between 1980 to 2012 was 704.8
billion dollars3

The average political
globalization score between 1980
to 2010 in Chile was 78.82

The average political
globalization score between 1980
to 2010 in Mexico was 68.96

22

The data on the share of the executive in the lower house only goes to 2010. Unfortunately, data is
missing for the majority of years between 1980 to 2010
23
In 2005 constant U.S dollars
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The results from this chapter show that remittances have a significant impact on
the adoption of external voting in the Latin America and the Caribbean. The role of
remittances is almost always discussed in the scholarly literature on external voting, but
previous studies have not found a statistically significant relationship between the two.
Perhaps this is because most studies tend to look at a combination of the world’s richest
and poorest countries in the same model. It is very plausible that countries like the
United States and Mexico do not have the same motivating factors to adopt external
voting. The other significant variable, whether a country has a left leaning executive,
might only be applicable to the Latin America and the Caribbean since the region has a
history of a mass exodus of the political left because of right leaning authoritarian
regimes (Pellegrino, 2000).
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Chapter 7:
Conclusion
In the last few decades, there have been developments that have made countries
around the world more willing to allow its migrant population to have the opportunity to
vote from abroad. External voting went from being almost exclusively practiced by a
relatively few number of countries, which tended to be highly consolidated democracies,
to now being implemented in countries that are not accustomed to holding elections.
Despite the large number of countries having adopted and implemented external voting
laws, the scholarly literature on the topic has remained somewhat limited.
The global spread of democracy and elections are important reasons to why this
trend has occurred, but much is still unknown to why countries adopt and implement
external voting. This thesis is an attempt to increase the knowledge to what factors
influence countries to adopt external voting in Latin America and the Caribbean.
This study illustrated the political process that takes place when external voting
legislations are being considered. Politicians and political parties must make a calculated
choice between pleasing those who are abroad and often make significant financial
contributions to the economy, and more importantly making sure that their own political
futures will not be put into jeopardy. The case studies on Chile and Mexico demonstrated
how political parties in both countries based their decision of whether to support external
voting on how it might influence their electoral gains in the future.
Previous studies often tend to explain the rise in external voting because states
want something in return or that states tend to enact external voting for symbolic reasons.
I partly agree with these theories, however, this study found that the importance of the
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political process that takes place in most countries when deciding whether external voting
should be adopted is significant. It is important to consider that in most countries the
political establishment will only allow external voting if the main actors do not see it as a
threat to their political future. As Barbara Geddes (1991) has stated when explaining
administrative reform in Latin America; “Reforms only occur in political circumstances
that render the individual interests of the politicians who must initiate them consistent
with the collective interest in reform” (Geddes, 1991, 371).
An interesting finding of this paper is the nonlinear relationship that remittances
have on the likelihood that a country will adopt external voting. The impact of
remittances as percent of GDP is nonlinear, after accounting for tipping point the effects
dissipates. Politicians are willing to reward those abroad for contributing financially to
their country-of-origin, just as long as those abroad are not seen to be too powerful to
challenge their power. In some cases the main political actors do allow those abroad to
vote, but they also make sure that their influences will be limited by creating strict
electoral rules.
Although the number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean adopting
and implanting external voting has increased greatly in the last few years, these laws
often seem to be more symbolic than anything else. It should be expected that turnout
will be lower abroad than it is in the home country, but many countries including Bolivia
and Mexico have put in institutional constraints that greatly limit the potential influences
of those abroad.
It could be argued that Mexican migrants had more political power before the
2005 law adopting external voting was passed, because the Mexican political parties are
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no longer allowed to campaign abroad, limiting the interaction with Mexican migrants
and politicians. Furthermore, financial contributions from Mexicans abroad is also not
permitted which largely constraints the power of emigrants to reward or punish the
political parties.
The electoral impact that emigrants have had so far in most countries that allow
external voting is limited. Nonetheless, external voting is an important topic. There have
been examples around the world where those voting from abroad have played significant
role in election outcomes. In 2006, emigrant voters played a key role in deciding election
results in both Italy and Cape Verde (Bauböck, 2007). Furthermore, close elections in
several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean also show the potential political
power of migrants in future elections. Even a symbolic external voting legislation can be
an important gesture that shows the migrant community that they are still part of the
nation and that there voice is heard. External voting can also be a step to repair the
relationship between states and the migrant community, especially in countries where
forced exile or persecution has been used as a part of a strategy to silence opponents.
When Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition lost in 2006, he questioned the legitimacy of
the emigrant vote (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). External voting has also been challenged
due to low turnout rates. Subsequently, if the trend of more countries allowing external
voting continues, a normative dialogue among policy makers and academics needs to
continue to address the question what role migrants should have in the political process of
their country-of-origin. Currently, the legitimacy of those aboard can be challenged on
the grounds that they should not decide who governs and on the grounds that they do not
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turn out in enough numbers to justify the relatively high cost that is associated with
external voting.
It is likely that countries around the world will continue to enfranchise those
living abroad, as migrant are expected to continue to request more rights from their stateof-origin (Bach, 2011). The changing perceptions of migrants will promote the increase
in external voting becaus migrants are less often seen as no longer having a voice in the
their country-of-origin affairs because they left. Technological innovations have made it
easier for emigrants to stay in contact with friends and family in their country-of-origin.
Technology has also minimized the cost for emigrants to lobby political parties and
governments in their home country to allow them to vote while abroad. States are also
likely to be interested in continuing enfranchising those abroad in order to maintain a
connection with its migrant community. The biggest challenge will come from the
political parties who must decide whether it is in their best interest to include a new group
of voters that potentially might challenge their power.
Future research on the topic could look at other regions to see if the findings are
limited to only Latin America and the Caribbean. It would also be interesting to see more
research on how emigrants impact their governments on a more regional level.
Additional research on external voting could include further case studies to see whether
the posited hypothesis that politicians make a calculated decision whether or not to adopt
external voting based on their best interests. A limitation of this study is that numerous
countries had to be dropped because of lack of data as the Latin America and the
Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2008 (Huber, Stephen and Mustillo, 2012) omits
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several countries in the region. Furthermore, this study only look at the adoption of
external voting and not if countries had actually implemented the laws.
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Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Adopted
External Voting
Remittance
Inflow
Freedomhouse
Score
Econglobal
Score
Polglobal Score
Diffusion
Execlhshare
Left executive

670

0.0179104

0.1327251

0

1

567

589761922

1835635713

6038.03

22741840918

668

2.6564371

1.4019168

1

7

643

57.7629082

20.7611743

9.66

94.56

643
670
268
287

50.1293313
0.3342537
0.4629310
0.2996516

19.4700772
0.3955488
0.1980346
0.4589055

11.33
0
0
0

89.94
1
1
1

Countries Used in the study
Countries that adopted
external voting laws

Year law was adopted

Countries that did not adopt
external voting laws

Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama

1991
1998
2009
2009
1997
2002
2001
2005
2000
2006

Paraguay
Venezuela

2011
1993

Antigua and Barbuda
Chile
Dominica
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Haiti
Jamaica
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Suriname
Uruguay
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PSC 101: Introduction to American Politics (with Dr. Steven
Parker)

Languages:
English
Icelandic
French
Spanish:
Swedish:

Fluent
Fluent
Professional Working Proficiency
Professional Working Proficiency
Elementary Proficiency

Related Experience:
Fall 2007
Summer 2007

Intern for U.S House of Representatives John Sullivan (OK-01)Washington D.C
Research Experience for Undergraduates Sponsored by the
National Science Foundation-Stillwater, Oklahoma

Relevant Graduate Level Coursework:
Research Methods in Political Science (with Dr. David Damore)
International Politics of Population, Technology and Resources (with Dr. Dennis Pirages)
Latin American Politics (with Dr. John Tuman)
Proseminar in Comparative Politics (with Dr. John Tuman)
Comparative Democratization (with Dr. Michele Kuenzi)

Honors, Awards, and Membership:
2008
2008
2008
2007
2006

President of Pi Sigma Alpha—Political Science Honor Society
Deans Honor Roll
Golden Key International Honor Society
National Science Foundation Grant—Research Experience for
Undergraduates
President’s Honor Roll

Other Experiences:
Jan-June 2012
2010-2011

Private English Teacher. Guadalajara, Mexico
Barman and Manager at Molly Malones. Bordeaux, France
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